May 2010 Archives by date

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Starting: Sat May 1 02:15:22 PDT 2010
Ending: Mon May 31 09:23:24 PDT 2010
Messages: 446

• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Fwd: Fwd: Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Jonathan Lundell
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   VoteFair at SolutionsCreative.com
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   VoteFair at SolutionsCreative.com
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   VoteFair at SolutionsCreative.com
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Markus Schulze
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Markus Schulze
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Raph Frank
• [EM] WMA   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] WMA   C.Benham
• [EM] WMA   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Greenparty - Council elections   James Gilmour
• [EM] Beatpath program for meetings   Árpád Magosányi
• [EM] The rise and fall of Bucklin voting in the United States   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Underneath the hood: Controversy over the "best" voting system.   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] WMA (It's not monotonic or participation compliant, after all)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] WMA (It's not monotonic or participation compliant, after all)   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] MinMax(AWP)   C.Benham
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   'Richard Fobes'
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Andrew Myers
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] WMA (It's not monotonic or participation compliant, after all)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] MinMax(AWP)   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Compatibility   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Richard Fobes
• [EM] Simulations on method similarity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Compatibility   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] VoteFair representation ranking recommended for Czech Green Party   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] The rise and fall of Bucklin voting in the United States   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Condorcet How?   C.Benham
• [EM] Compatibility   Juho
• [EM] Fw: Roots of STV and Proxy Delegation   Terry Bouricius
• [EM] the intrinsic value of the metric of *strength* of personal preference (was: Re: Compatibility)   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] the intrinsic value of the metric of *strength* of personalpreference (was: Re: Compatibility)   James Gilmour
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] MinMax(AWP)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] MinMax(AWP)   Chris Benham
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Terry Bouricius
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] piling on against IRV (was ... Czech Green party - Council elections)   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV (was ... Czech Green party - Council elections)   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Simulations on method similarity 2   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] the intrinsic value of the metric of *strength* of personal preference (was: Re: Compatibility)   Juho
• [EM] the intrinsic value of the metric of *strength* of personalpreference (was: Re: Compatibility)   Juho
• [EM] Fwd: Proportionality proof of Schulze proportional ranking   Markus Schulze
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Raph Frank
• [EM] Fwd: Proportionality proof of Schulze proportional ranking   Raph Frank
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Fw: Roots of STV and Proxy Delegation   Jonathan Lundell
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] another question regarding the UK PM election...   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] another question regarding the UK PM election...   Diego Santos
• [EM] another question regarding the UK PM election...   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] another question regarding the UK PM election...   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] another question regarding the UK PM election...   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV (was ... Czech Green party - Council elections)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] Meta-criteria 1 of 9: values (utility, expressiveness, legitimacy, and ease) and heuristics (simplicity, flexibility, and fairness/honesty)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 2 of 9: Value: Utility (outcome social utility, aka Bayesian regret)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 3 of 9: Value: expressiveness   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 4 of 9: Value: legitimacy (and consensus)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 5 of 9: Value: ease (cost)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 7 of 9: Heuristic: flexibility   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 8 of 9: Heuristic: fairness/honesty. (long - includes strategy typology)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] piling on against IRV (was ... Czech Green party - Council elections)   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV (was ... Czech Green party - Council elections)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Michael Allan
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Raph Frank
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] An Approval variant of M-Set Webster   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Terry Bouricius
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jonathan Lundell
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Andrew Myers
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections   Markus Schulze
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Juho
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Juho
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Juho
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jonathan Lundell
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Juho
• [EM] Meta-criteria 3 of 9: Value: expressiveness   Raph Frank
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] [ESF #1080] Re: Meta-criteria 3 of 9: Value: expressiveness   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Article: Electoral dysfunction: Why democracy is always unfair (New Scientist)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Article: Electoral dysfunction: Why democracy is always unfair (New Scientist)   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Hybrid/generalized ranked/approval ballots   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Meta-criteria 6 of 9: Heuristics. #1, simplicity   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] [ESF #1080] Re: Meta-criteria 3 of 9: Value: expressiveness   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] [ESF #1080] Re: Meta-criteria 3 of 9: Value: expressiveness   Andrew Myers
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] [ESF #1080] Re: Meta-criteria 3 of 9: Value: expressiveness   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] piling on against IRV   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] piling on against IRV   Jonathan Lundell
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   Chris Benham
• [EM] direct / proxy voting paper, now online -- requesting comments   James Green-Armytage
• [EM] proxy ideas: continual consideration, and proxy committees   James Green-Armytage
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] [RangeVoting] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] [ESF #1100] Re: [RangeVoting] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Chris Benham
• [EM] [ESF #1101] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] [ESF #1101] Why Not Condorcet?   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Article: Electoral dysfunction: Why democracy is always unfair (New Scientist)   Fred Gohlke
• [EM] [ESF #1100] Re: [RangeVoting] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] [ESF #1107] Another bullet vote argument   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Article: Electoral dysfunction: Why democracy is always unfair (New Scientist)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] [ESF #1100] Re: [RangeVoting] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] [ESF #1113] Another bullet vote argument   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1118] Another bullet vote argument)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1118] Another bullet vote argument)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1126] Another bullet vote argument)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1126] Another bullet vote argument)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] . Re: Why Not Condorcet?   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1118] Another bullet vote argument)   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] . Re: Why Not Condorcet?   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1118] Another bullet vote argument)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] MEA CULPA   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Bucklin strategy (was: Fwd: [ESF #1126] Another bullet vote argument)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Visualizing Covering   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Quick Runoff (QR) LNHarm method and commentary   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   C.Benham
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Visualizing covering   Warren Smith
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Warren Smith
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] [ESF #1185] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Visualizing Covering   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   VoteFair at SolutionsCreative.com
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Raph Frank
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Terry Bouricius
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   VoteFair at SolutionsCreative.com
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Condorcet and other authors on Condorcet (and how does range voting fit in?)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Raph Frank
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Terry Bouricius
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czechgreen party)   James Gilmour
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Bob Richard
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   Juho
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Juho
• [EM] Visualizing Covering   Juho
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Juho
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Jonathan Lundell
• [EM] Proposal: Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA)   Juho
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Raph Frank
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Raph Frank
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Raph Frank
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.   C.Benham
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Raph Frank
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Raph Frank
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   Juho
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Why Not Condorcet?   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Sequential Proportional Approval - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method (was: SAV)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Range Voting in presence of partial information of a certain character   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Sequential Proportional Approval - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method (was: SAV)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Sequential Proportional Approval - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method (was: SAV)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Juho
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Raph Frank
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Juho
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Why proportional elections - Power arguments needed (Czech green party)   Raph Frank
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Juho
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Min Reluctance Range DSV   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Raph Frank
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Min Reluctance Range DSV   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Aaron Armitage
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] PAV and risk functions   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Juho
• [EM] How to combine list and candidate ranking based proportionality?   Raph Frank
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Chris Benham
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Juho
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   C.Benham
• [EM] direct / proxy voting paper, now online -- requesting comments   Michael Allan
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   C.Benham
• [EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] PAV and risk functions   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] PAV and risk functions   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] SAV generalized to any kind of Range Ballots   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Juho
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] PAV and risk functions   Peter Zbornik
• [EM] The general form of Quick Runoff   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] SPST can't be as generous as I thought   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] meditations   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Documentation of Methods - Wow look at those insights about drawbacks   Alex Rollin
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Documentation of Methods - Wow look at those insights about drawbacks   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Documentation of Methods - Wow look at those insights about drawbacks   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] Documentation of Methods - Wow look at those insights about drawbacks   Juho
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] The worst about each system; ...   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Juho
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] IRV vs Condorcet   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Juho
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Kevin Venzke
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] IRV vs Condorcet   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] [ESF #1311] Re: The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] IRV vs Condorcet   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer   Juho
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Kathy Dopp
• [EM] [Condorcet] Re: IRV vs Condorcet   Dave Ketchum
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] SMD,TR fails the Plurality criterion.   C.Benham
• [EM] [Condorcet] Re: IRV vs Condorcet   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] SMD,TR fails the Plurality criterion.   Chris Benham
• [EM] [Condorcet] Re: IRV vs Condorcet   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Bucklin-like method meeting Favorite Betrayal and Irrelevant Ballots   Chris Benham
• [EM] An assortment of recently online Condorcet elections, some with ballot data   Andrew Myers
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] meditations   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Bucklin-like method meeting Favorite Betrayal and Irrelevant Ballots   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Bucklin-like method meeting Favorite Betrayal and Irrelevant Ballots   Chris Benham
• [EM] Preliminary Range PAV results   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] Cabal equilibrium and Strategy overshoot   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential   Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
• [EM] Cabal equilibrium and Strategy overshoot   Jameson Quinn
• [EM] How to make summable any method based on range ballots.   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] How to make summable any method based on range ballots.   Kristofer Munsterhjelm
• [EM] [Condorcet] Re: IRV vs Condorcet   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] IRV vs Condorcet   robert bristow-johnson
• [EM] Tanking advantage of cycle proof conditions   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Taking advantage of cycle proof conditions   fsimmons at pcc.edu
• [EM] Preliminary Range PAV results   Kristofer Munsterhjelm

Last message date: Mon May 31 09:23:24 PDT 2010
Archived on: Sun Jun 29 22:34:42 PDT 2014

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