[EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

[Kathy Dopp]

On Thu, May 20, 2010 at 11:35 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<km-elmet at broadpark.no> wrote:
> Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>
>> Would that system still be additive like SAV is? Not sure how you
>> obtain the satisfaction scores for each possible group of winning
>> candidates or candidate satisfaction scores from voters' satisfaction
>> scores.
>
> No, it wouldn't be.
>
> As for how the satisfaction scores are determined: first define a function
> f, s.th. f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, f(2) = 1 + 1/2, f(3) = 1 + 1/2 + 1/3, etc.
>
> Then, for some given candidate council, each voter v contributes f(q_v)
> points where q_v is the cardinality of the intersection of the candidates
> that voter approved, and the candidates in the council in question.
>
> Sum up these scores for all voters. The council (outcome) which would
> maximize the sum, wins.

So the system would be additive only from the sense of precinct sums
for each of the possible unique council subsets?

So if it were an 4 member council being elected (or four seats in a
council) and there were 10 candidates, how many precinct sums would
there have to be?

I think you'd have to publish all the individual ballots of all the
voters to make that one auditable, just like with IRV/STV, right?


>



-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

View my research on my SSRN Author page:
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