[EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at broadpark.no
Thu May 20 08:35:49 PDT 2010
Kathy Dopp wrote:
> Would that system still be additive like SAV is? Not sure how you
> obtain the satisfaction scores for each possible group of winning
> candidates or candidate satisfaction scores from voters' satisfaction
> scores.
No, it wouldn't be.
As for how the satisfaction scores are determined: first define a
function f, s.th. f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, f(2) = 1 + 1/2, f(3) = 1 + 1/2 +
1/3, etc.
Then, for some given candidate council, each voter v contributes f(q_v)
points where q_v is the cardinality of the intersection of the
candidates that voter approved, and the candidates in the council in
question.
Sum up these scores for all voters. The council (outcome) which would
maximize the sum, wins.
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list