[EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.
robert bristow-johnson
rbj at audioimagination.com
Wed May 12 14:51:38 PDT 2010
On May 12, 2010, at 5:46 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> BTR-IRV is like IRV, but when deciding which candidate to eliminate,
> you check the two worst candidates (Plurality wise), and the one
> that is beaten by the other is eliminated. This ensures that a CW
> can never be eliminated, for it will beat all other candidates.
wow! i never heard of that. it's a Condorcet-compliant method that
uses IRV-like elimination, but the elimination is smarter than what is
commonly done with IRV. intriguing.
--
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list