[EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Wed May 12 14:51:38 PDT 2010


On May 12, 2010, at 5:46 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

> BTR-IRV is like IRV, but when deciding which candidate to eliminate,  
> you check the two worst candidates (Plurality wise), and the one  
> that is beaten by the other is eliminated. This ensures that a CW  
> can never be eliminated, for it will beat all other candidates.


wow!  i never heard of that.  it's a Condorcet-compliant method that  
uses IRV-like elimination, but the elimination is smarter than what is  
commonly done with IRV.  intriguing.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."







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