[EM] Meta-criteria 9 of 9: Conclusion

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/5/7 Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>

> On May 7, 2010, at 12:20 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> Finally, I come to the end of this series. To conclude, let me return to
> the initial question which started me down this path: what do the values and
> heuristics have to say about voting system criteria?
>
> Utility (that is, outcome social utility) is a unique value in that we have
> a single clear tool for analysis: Bayesian regret simulations. The only two
> things we need are a model for voter utilities - which should have only
> weak, linear effects on the performance of a given system - and a model for
> voter strategy. I hope that my analysis of strategy helps us get the latter.
> And meanwhile, I hope that the outstanding issues of strategy, along with
> the issues of expressivity, legitimacy, and cost, can help the partisans of
> Bayesian regret analysis (a group in which I weakly include myself) be
> humble about the results so far.
>
>
> Since the world of measuring personal and group utilities is very complex I
> find it useful to sometimes simplify things by fist naming the targets and
> assumptions and then comparing the candidate methods against this simplified
> model.
>
> When trying to measure the true utilities one often sets some limiting
> assumptions like utilities that are normalized to some given range of
> values. One may also have different targets in different elections.
> Sometimes one wants to maximize the sum of utilities, sometimes maximize the
> smallest personal utility. One could also have some more sophisticated
> functions that e.g. try to lift the utility of 90% of the voters/citizens to
> some agreed/ideal level.
>
> Models that are based on rankings are simplified and practical models of
> the world. It is interesting that often such models are considered to be
> ideal. I mean that for example the majority principle is taken as granted
> although it can be seen to violate some underlying utility principles (the
> minority might have stronger opinions). But models agreed by the society and
> well working models (that can e.g. handle strategic temptations) have a
> value of their own and therefore may be adopted as "values".
>
>
Thanks for your response. You have some interesting points about utility not
necessarily being summed. As to whether the majority principle is
fundamental even though it can contradict utility: in my schema, you'd
defend such a position with arguments grounded in legitimacy and/or
expressivity, and quite possibly couched in terms of fairness/honesty (that
is, strategy).


> For these reasons (complexity and debatability of the true utilities,
> different needs in different elections, assumptions on the society
> (competitiveness, morale, traditions), influence of models that we have
> created ourselves, need to meet also some (irrational) marketability ad
> perception related needs) it may often be enough to just state the targets
> and assumptions (the model to be used) and then try to implement that using
> some concrete method. The value of the model (targets, assumptions) and the
> properties of the method (that tries to implement the targets) can then be
> discussed separately.
>

Agreed; the discussion of the model and its values is in many cases separate
from implementation.


>
>
> The criteria that relate to expressivity are mainly participation,
> consistency, and related criteria. There is a certain fundamental tension
> between expressive freedom and outcome utility in a decisive system. Ballots
> which give a large degree of decisive freedom to voters inevitably involve
> strategic tradeoffs between utility and expressivity. Perhaps one way to
> resolve this is to make a hybrid system, which is part election and part
> nonbinding poll. The election part would strictly limit voter freedom in
> order to eliminate strategic concerns; two-rank Bucklin is one possible
> example of the limited freedom I'm imagining. And the poll part - probably
> based on Range, for maximum freedom - would allow free expressiveness; while
> it wouldn't be binding, to keep stratgic concerns from taking over, it would
> certainly affect a candidate's mandate. The poll would be optional; a simple
> Bucklin vote would be counted with some default assumptions about what that
> means in Range terms. Maybe you could even give marginal impact to the poll
> without making it too strategic. For instance, if you were building a polity
> from scratch, the rule could be that a Bucklin winner is elected, and if
> they're also a Range winner they get an extra year on their term; or that
> the Range winner gets to appoint the attorney general; or some such marginal
> importance for the poll.
>
>
> Note that in competitive environments also pure polls may get strategic. If
> we have first a poll and then an Approval election it might make sense to
> give strategic answers in the poll to make my Approval favourite look
> stronger than some other candidate in order to make the supporters of that
> other candidate approve also my favourite (since the strategic advice in
> Approval will be to approve at least one of the leading candidates). Also in
> other elections people tend to vote for strong candidates / potential
> winners.
>
>
My intent was to propose a nonbinding poll which would be conducted on the
same ballots as, and thus simultaneously with, the actual election. Any
valid vote would be interpreted as an answer in the poll, but this answer
could be overridden by the voter, either to add subtlety, or effectively to
say what part of the actual vote was strategic. This proposal flows from the
realization that expressivity and outcome utility are separate values, and
that forcing them together sometimes brings them into conflict.

I understand that some might argue that this proposal would hurt legitimacy.
What if the election winner was not the poll winner? Personally, I'd argue
that if this is true, it's better to know it. Either way, the society would
get a better understanding of the true legitimacy of the winners. With a
good system, disagreements would be rare, and so legitimacy overall would
increase; and when they occurred, they could be an important, though
symbolic, check on the mandate of a winner who's true legitimacy is weak.


>
> The criteria that relate to legitimacy are participation; consistency; and
> clone-, strategy-, and fraud- resistance criteria.
>
> The main criterion that relates to cost is one-round decisiveness.
>
>
> (Maybe also time and effort to count and verify the results, and need to
> buy voting machines, and maybe also need to debate about the results after
> the elections.)
>

Sure.

JQ
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