[EM] Why Not Condorcet?

Juho juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Wed May 19 14:08:11 PDT 2010


On May 16, 2010, at 2:17 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:

> --- En date de : Sam 15.5.10, Dave Ketchum  
> <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :

>> On May 14, 2010, at 7:08 PM, Kevin
>> Venzke wrote:

>>> 4. Too complicated to explain, or propose (a
>> conceptual hurdle with
>>> Condorcet is that we leave the actual ballots for the
>> pairwise matrix
>>> right away, making it hard to understand how voting
>> different ways
>>> could change things)
>>      Some Condorcet methods of handling
>> cycles are truly complex - I recommend choosing a method for
>> which cycle explaining is doable.
>>      Counting into the matrix should
>> class as understandable.
>
> It's possible. I do think it would be helpful if Condorcet could be
> defined in terms of how a single ballot "goes through the process." In
> essence Condorcet sucks all the data out of the ballots like a  
> vacuum and
> finds the best winner without thinking about which ballot said what.  
> This
> makes for a pretty good method but it's also what means Condorcet  
> provides
> relatively few concrete guarantees to the individual voter.

Here's one attempt to describe the Condorcet process from the point of  
view of one single ballot for one simple Condorcet method  
(minmax(margins)).

The method counts how many additional supporters each candidate would  
need (or have extra) to beat all other candidates in pairwise  
comparisons.

 From one single ballot point of view, if one ranks X above Y in the  
ballot then X will need one vote less to beat Y and Y will need one  
vote more to beat X.

Juho







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