[EM] minimizing reluctance by DSV
Jameson Quinn
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Mon May 24 11:27:19 PDT 2010
2010/5/24 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>
> Hi Forest,
>
> --- En date de : Sam 22.5.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a
> écrit :
> > The alternative X is used as the approval cutoff. On
> > some of the ballots the
> > cutoff is considered excluded (not including X as approved)
> > but on just enough
> > ballots to make X the approval winner, the cutoff is
> > considered inclusive (so on
> > these ballots X is approved).
> >
> > The "reluctance" of ballot B in approving X is the
> > difference between the
> > maxrange value and the rating given to alternative X by
> > ballot B.
> >
> > Elect the alternative X with the least possible reluctance
> > total.
>
> I don't understand how you determine which ballots approve X. Is it
> random, or irrelevant? Or do you have to find the selection which will
> minimize reluctance to electing X?
>
> Kevin
>
> Forest replies:
>
> Yes, the selection that minimizes reluctance. That’s why I put the word
> “possible” in the
> phrase, “minimum possible reluctance.”
>
> Start by approving X on all of the ballots with zero reluctance for X, then
> move on to the ballots that have
> a reluctance of one, etc. until there is enough approval for X to overcome
> the approval for the candidates
> that are preferred over X .
>
>
Um, wouldn't that just be plurality? That is, you'd start with zero
reluctance, and the plurality leader would win. That would automatically
beat any win with nonzero reluctance.
I think you mean, then, to "Elect the alternative X with the least possible
reluctance total for a majority win". That system is some kind of hybrid
between Abd's Range/Bucklin proposal and a Condorcet method. I like it - but
it is basically a non-starter until you have an explicit algorithm for
finding the correct winner.
JQ
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20100524/4be364ab/attachment-0003.htm>
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list