[EM] A method "DNA" generator, tester, and fixer

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed May 26 17:01:12 PDT 2010


Hi Juho,

--- En date de : Mer 26.5.10, Juho <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
> >> The following criterion is similar to
> Plurality.  Does
> >> it have a name?
> >> 
> >> If the number of ballots on which X beats Y is
> greater than
> >> the number of
> >> ballots on which Y is ranked, then Y cannot be
> elected.
> 
> >> Any decent method that doesn't satisfy it?
> > 
> > This criterion is strictly stronger than Plurality, so
> I'd have to ask
> > whether you think any decent methods fail Plurality.
> Probably the answer
> > is no, not really.
> 
> This says that all typical margins based Condorcet methods
> would not be "decent". One could ask the question also in
> the reverse direction. All methods violate some criteria
> that look good at least at first sight. Which property of
> the plurality criterion (or the new criterion) makes it a
> mandatory requirement for all election methods (or Condorcet
> or ranked methods)?

Personally I would allow Plurality failures for a good reason.

But I think that most people would generally not be accepting. This would
be because of a view that there is such a thing as "support" involved in
voting for a candidate and this can't be found when one truncates a 
candidate. So when you compare a candidate X who is the favorite of 10
voters, and you can't find that many voters who "support" Y on their
ballots in any way, something seems wrong when Y wins. The thought is
why would you ever need to elect Y when you could just elect X? It's
similar to Pareto in that sense.

Really I have no idea what Forest has in mind by "decent." Maybe he
does find margins or MMPO to be decent. I believe he even accepts random
methods if there's a point to them, so who knows.

Kevin


      



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