[EM] Satisfaction Approval Voting - A Better Proportional Representation Electoral Method

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 03:49 PM 5/19/2010, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>"Satisfaction Approval Voting" is a new proportional representation
>approval voting method, devised by political scientist Steven J.
>Brams, Department of Politics, New York University and D. Marc
>Kilgour, Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University.

SAV is essentially Plurality-at-large, single-vote, with division of 
votes in case of "overvoting."

I proposed the same method, in effect, with FAAV, Fractional Approval 
Asset Voting. SAV is just this without the Asset part to handle what 
would otherwise be wasted votes.

>Unlike instant runoff voting, Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV) can
>use existing ballot layouts, is precinct-summable (additive), and
>treats all voters equally and fairly.

It's tricky. It relies upon clones to negotiate on a single candidacy 
or see their votes wasted. FAAV would empower bullet votes, but also 
allow 'virtual committees" to do that negotiation, now knowing what 
voting power they have. Overall, far more efficient, I'd suggest, and 
SAV can still waste a huge number of votes.

If you are going to do a proportional representation system, SAV 
relies upon an assumption of equal approval of candidates. That makes 
it impossible for it to analyze and find true representation. Far 
better would be an STV-like system that seeks to assign a relatively 
trusted representative to as many voters as possible.

The system could be, as to ballot, SAV, but with a Range ballot 
instead of a simply plurality ballot. I won't describe details here. 
SAV is certainly an improvement over Plurality-at-large, just as 
ordinary approval is an improvement over vote-for-one Plurality. SAV 
reduces to plurality if voters vote for a single candidate. I think 
SAV is a nno-starter because of the effect on voters, who may well 
regret splitting their vote. But with a system where either votes 
aren't wasted at all (Asset) or vote wastage is minimized (STV-like 
systems that devalue or set aside ballots based on the election of 
representatives named on them and the ranking or rating of those 
representatives)

I found the paper quite obtuse, unnecessarily difficult. Instead of 
straighforwardly stating the method, the theoretical justification 
was first outlined. Frustrating way of writing, I'd say.

The basic method, as I understand it. To elect N representatives, 
votes vote an approval ballot, and may vote for as few or as many as 
they choose. If they vote for M candidates, their vote for each 
becomes 1/M. (The ballot is not considered if it does not contain a 
countable vote for a candidate, I presume.) The N candidates with the 
most votes wins.

Most of the paper is justification for why this is a Great Idea, and 
why the obvious problem (dilution of voting power when a voter votes 
for more than one) is a feature, not a bug, based on arguments that 
candidates will cooperate to choose to not split their vote. I find 
that rather ... speciulative. I.e., it may work sometimes, and fail 
spectacularly at other times.

Asset voting, FAAV, would use the same ballot and counting mechanism, 
but would simply assign those votes to the candidates, who *then* 
negotiate who gets the seat. If I cooperate with you to create, say, 
a seat for you, you know where your bread was buttered. I'll have 
some influence. In full-blown continuous Asset systems, I would only 
be choosing you as a representative in deliberation, I'd retain the 
right to vote my votes on issues, if I choose. Some would, some 
wouldn't.... your vote would count all my votes if I don't directly vote.

But short of that, if it's a pure election, final till the next 
election, no continuous voting rights, I would still ordinarily have 
privileged access to you. Or, next election, I won't give you my 
votes again! (If I still get some.... it would depend on the voters 
who supported me understanding the situation: did you renege on any 
agreements we had, or was I stupid and to blame for trusting you in 
the first place .... or both.))