[EM] Why Not Condorcet?

[Dave Ketchum]

On May 16, 2010, at 9:24 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> At 06:34 PM 5/15/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>> Some objections to Condorcet could be:
>>> 1. It is not expressive enough (compared to ratings)
>> Truly less expressive in some ways than ratings.
>>     This is balanced by not demanding ratings details.
>>     And more expressive by measuring differences between each pair
>> of candidates.
>
> "Demanding" is an odd word to use for "allowing." "Condorcet"  
> doesn't really refer to ballot form, though it is often assumed to  
> use a full-ranking ballot. In any case, a ballot that allows full  
> ranking, if it allows equal ranking and this causes an empty space  
> to open up for each equal ranking, is a ratings ballot, in fact.  
> It's Borda count converted to Range by having fixed ranks that  
> assume equal preference strength. Then the voter assigns the  
> candidates to the ranks. It is simply set-wise ranking, but the  
> voter may simply rank any way the voter pleases, and full ranking is  
> a reasonable option, just as is bullet voting or intermediate  
> options, as fits the opinion of the voter.

Assuming I LIKE A, B & C are almost as good, and I DISlike D:

I can rate A=99, B=98, C=98, D=0 or rank A high, B&C each medium, and  
D low (A>B=C>D).

The example ratings of A, B,&C do the most I can to make any of them  
win over D; the example rankings do the most I can to make A win, D  
lose, and give B&C an equal chance.

In Condorcet I ranked A over B and C over D but could not express the  
magnitude of these differences.  In Score I must rate with numeric  
values that include the differences.

I do not understand "empty spaces" above.  B&C being equally liked got  
equal rating and equal ranking - exactly the same as one of them would  
have earned with the other omitted.