[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections

Terry Bouricius terryb at burlingtontelecom.net
Wed May 5 17:09:04 PDT 2010


Peter Z.,

Ralph wrote <snip>

"The first problem with this one is that it will elect the President is
the IRV winner.  This gets you a non-centerist President.  Even if you
use this proposal, I would strongly recommend electing the President
with a condorcet compliant method for the first ranking position and
the proceed to the next steps."
<snip>

Clarification...IRV does not "get you a non-centrist" winner. IRV elects
the centrist Condorcet winner in most scenarios, though it does not assure
it in certain scenarios. A "weak" Condorcet winner (a candidate with
relatively few first preferences) can lose under IRV...But that may or may
not be considered desirable by the Czech Green Party, depending partly on
the function of President. It is important to understand that a Condorcet
winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first preferences...A weak
Condorcet winner may be a "centrist" or merely a pleasant person who
nobody knows much about and has avoided making any enemies. If the
President is primarily a meeting facilitator, this may be fine. If the
President is the public face of the party, a more charismatic leader (who
may have made some enemies within the party) might (or might not) be
preferable.

This list has a lot of people who are sold on the priority of the
Condorcet criterion, but there are other perspectives to consider.

Terry Bouricius




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