[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections
Dave Ketchum
davek at clarityconnect.com
Wed May 5 18:48:05 PDT 2010
"a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences."
True in Condorcet, though not expected to happen often. Compared with
each other candidate, the CW must win in each such pair. Each such
can have first preference over the CW as seen by SOME voters.
IRV, looking only at first preferences while deciding which to
discard, will discard such a CW. It is IRV's discarding without
looking at all that the voters vote that makes many of us desire to
discard IRV.
Dave Ketchum
On May 5, 2010, at 8:09 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
> Peter Z.,
>
> Ralph wrote <snip>
>
> "The first problem with this one is that it will elect the President
> is
> the IRV winner. This gets you a non-centerist President. Even if you
> use this proposal, I would strongly recommend electing the President
> with a condorcet compliant method for the first ranking position and
> the proceed to the next steps."
> <snip>
>
> Clarification...IRV does not "get you a non-centrist" winner. IRV
> elects
> the centrist Condorcet winner in most scenarios, though it does not
> assure
> it in certain scenarios. A "weak" Condorcet winner (a candidate with
> relatively few first preferences) can lose under IRV...But that may
> or may
> not be considered desirable by the Czech Green Party, depending
> partly on
> the function of President. It is important to understand that a
> Condorcet
> winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first preferences...A
> weak
> Condorcet winner may be a "centrist" or merely a pleasant person who
> nobody knows much about and has avoided making any enemies. If the
> President is primarily a meeting facilitator, this may be fine. If the
> President is the public face of the party, a more charismatic leader
> (who
> may have made some enemies within the party) might (or might not) be
> preferable.
>
> This list has a lot of people who are sold on the priority of the
> Condorcet criterion, but there are other perspectives to consider.
>
> Terry Bouricius
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