[EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Jameson Quinn wrote:

> Condorcet winner is M. But if all the RC>M voters truncate before M, 
> then M does not beat R and L, so there's two cycles M>RC>R,L>M. Most 
> Condorcet tiebreakers, including Schulze and Minimax, would name RC as 
> the winner. (Of course, if the M voters retaliate in kind, then R or L 
> would win Condorcet, or M would win Approval, Range, or Bucklin.)
 >
> There are two ways I can see to avoid this dilemma. One is LNH-type 
> elimination, such as in IRV or certain versions of Asset. Since RC is 
> eliminated before M, no lower votes of the RC voters can help RC win.

Would DH3-resistant Condorcet methods like Smith,IRV or BTR-IRV also 
resist the truncation strategy?