[EM] The worst about each system; Approval Preferential Voting (new name for an MCA-like system)

[robert bristow-johnson]

On May 25, 2010, at 1:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> What are the worst aspects of each major voting system?
>
> -Plurality: Everything. It routinely requires dishonest strategy  
> from a large minority, or even a majority, of voters. Enough said.

except some unnamed folks here (whose posts i don't see anymore) think  
that it's better than IRV.

> -IRV: Voting can hurt you (nonmonotonicity). That means that small  
> third parties can survive, but once they threaten to pass 25%,  
> you're back to the problems of plurality. A great learning tool to  
> understand this is http://zesty.ca/voting/voteline/ , which lets you  
> play with one-dimensional scenarios and see how common  
> nonmonotonicity is.

not only nonmonotonicity, your sincere first choice can help elect  
your worst choice as what has happened in the case study in Burlington  
VT in 2009.  savvy voters that realize that happened to them will  
consider voting strategy (compromising) in the next election to avoid  
electing their worst choice.  this was *precisely* what IRV (or any  
preferential voting system) was meant to avoid.

> -Condorcet: complexity.

i don't see it.  Condorcet is simple and defaults most directly to the  
"simple majority" rule of two-candidate elections.

> While the basic idea of one-on-one matches is simple, the details of  
> tiebreakers are enough to make most voters' eyes glaze over.

by "tiebreakers", do you mean methods to resolve a Condorcet cycle or  
paradox.  i would agree that Schulze (which i have nothing against, in  
fact i think it's the fairest way to do it) would make most voters'  
eyes glaze over.  but i don't think that is the case for Ranked Pairs  
which is almost as good as Schulze and will elect the same candidate  
virtually every time, and i would be happy to accept a suboptimal, but  
simpler, Condorcet (like elect the candidate with the most 1st choices  
in case of a cycle) just to *get* Condorcet adopted.  small price to  
pay, because i really am not convinced that cycles will happen very  
often at all.

> Moreover, the need to individually rank numerous candidates is more  
> work than many are ready for, and the inevitable shortcuts they'll  
> take could harm results.

there should always be ballot access laws.  there should never be more  
than 4 or 5 candidates on the ballot (along with Write-In).  if there  
are, the ballot access laws need to be more strict (more signatures  
required).  having 20 candidates on the ballot for a single seat is  
ridiculous.


> -Approval: divisiveness.
...
> -Range: Strategy is too powerful.

i couldn't get the guys at ESF to even acknowledge the obvious  
strategic considerations a voter would face with Approval or Range.   
they just say that "it's mathematically proven" to be better than  
anything else.  Clay Shentrup needs to get on this list and start  
defending his position rather than expecting me to do the same on his  
list.

Clay, i'll take you on here on EM, but not on ESF.  it takes too much  
time and is a far less objective context.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."