[EM] piling on against IRV

[robert bristow-johnson]

On May 6, 2010, at 12:01 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> On May 5, 2010, at 10:52 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>
>>  i am still convinced that it is fundamental in a democracy where  
>> each citizen's vote counts equally, that if a majority of voters  
>> agree that Candidate A (as in "Andy") is a better choice than  
>> Candidate B (as in "Bob"), then Candidate B should not be elected  
>> [unless perhaps when there is a cycle]. it's as simple as that, and  
>> because that is not the primary function of IRV, that's why it  
>> comes up short.
>
> Setting up rules is tricky, but many of us choke when we look  
> carefully at IRV.

i think it's tricky only in deciding *which* Condorcet method to  
adopt.  essentially it's tricky only in resolving a cycle.  where  
there is no cycle, i think the rules are simple, transparent, and  
completely compatible with the existing "simple majority" (FPTP) in a  
two-person race (where no one disagrees how the votes are counted and  
the winner is identified).

>> it's similar to the existence of the Electoral College in US  
>> presidential elections.  the E.C. doesn't do too bad when it elects  
>> the same candidate with the popular majority, but when it doesn't  
>> (like in 2000) it *never* brings legitimacy to the election  
>> result.  you don't hear people say "Whew!  That was close!  Boy am  
>> I glad we have this Electoral College to protect us from the rule  
>> of the population!"  so the E.C. does well when it agrees with the  
>> popular vote tabulation and not so well when it doesn't.  it raises  
>> the question as to why we should use the electoral vote over the  
>> popular vote at all.
>
> Before throwing rocks at the Electoral College it would pay to think  
> about how you would have managed campaigning for intelligent voting  
> to elect a President at the time the EC was created.

actually, even though few teach this in high school (we hear this crap  
about "The Framers were wary of giving the people the power to  
directly elect the President" or needing a privileged class to elect  
the president, that the masses weren't up to the task), but it was  
really about the mechanics of election integrity.  a very similar  
issue as to the problem of "precinct summability" that is so important  
to some (and i do not deny the desirability or importance of it for  
election integrity over a large nation, state, or territory).

220 years ago, it wasn't so easy to insure that Georgia or New  
Hampshire (or states less far from the seat of government in DC) could  
not pad their popular vote count.  so the method derived made it  
inconsequential if any state *did* pad their popular vote.  the  
"weight" of each state was determined separately and in advance as the  
number of electoral votes each state gets (as a function of the 10- 
year census).  and the authority to decide *how* the electoral votes  
assigned to each state where chosen was simply left to each state,  
this was *not* the within the purview of the federal government.  all  
the federal government needed to do was to decide if each slate of  
electors brought to the seat of government (for counting, now done on  
January 6th after the November election) was the authentic slate from  
each state.

then the federal government did not need to worry about any  
shenanigans going on in Cobb County, Georgia.  that was Georgia's  
problem, what Georgia had to do is determine what representative  
electors they were selecting, later collecting the votes from this  
small number of electors, and getting that record securely transmitted  
to the seat of government when the electoral votes were counted.  i  
think it made sense in 1788 with a weak federal government, no  
instantaneous electronic communication (not even the telegraph), and  
no secure means to monitor the polls in all of the places in the 13  
states.

if all of the 50 states did what Maine and Nebraska do (assign their  
electors in a more proportional manner) the goofy non-linear function  
that the winner-take-all laws of the other 48 states create on the  
nationwide electoral math would be greatly reduced.

>  What could and should be done now is an interesting topic.

i found this to be a fascinating solution: http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/ 
  .  it doesn't need to amend the U.S. Constitution to abolish  
electing the president with electors.  since it is already totally  
left to the states in *how* their own electors are chosen, if enough  
states adopt this interstate compact (enough to exceed the 270  
electoral votes needed to elect), the president will be elected by the  
national popular vote by way of state law.  very clever solution to  
obviate abolishing the electoral college.  it would be historical if  
this were adopted by enough states to be put into effect.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."