[EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.

[Chris Benham]

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (12 May 2010):
"One idea of mine, although extremely complex, would be to select the two 
candidates for a runoff by two Condorcet methods - one that's resistant 
to strategy (like Smith,IRV), and one that's not but provides better 
results in the honest vote case (e.g. Schulze, uncovered methods). Since 
the second round is honest - a two-candidate election where a majority 
wins is strategy-proof - it should lower the chances of ending up with a 
very bad candidate.

If the two methods agree, the candidate would win outright."
These sorts of schemes (a runoff between the winners of methods A and B)
invariably fail mono-raise and are vulnerable to Pushover strategy.

"The voters may also end up arguing that because the two methods agree so often 
(if they do), there's no need to have the runoff in the first place; if the method 
deters organized strategy, the organized strategy wouldn't appear and so the actual 
runoff mechanism would appear superfluous."
 
 
So "the threat of a runoff (that is never needed to be held) is deterring organised
strategy" is somehow an argument for abolishing the threat??
 
A better 2-round scheme would be to have all the members of the Smith set eligible
for the second round, which uses simple Approval.
 

Chris Benham