[EM] the intrinsic value of the metric of *strength* of personal preference (was: Re: Compatibility)

[robert bristow-johnson]

On May 5, 2010, at 12:22 PM, Juho wrote:

>  In the pairwise comparison based methods we must also take into  
> account the fact that we do not measure the strength of personal  
> preferences, and therefore the decisions that we make are often  
> simplified assumptions (i.e. one set of votes may refers to a wide  
> range of different possible sincere preference strengths).

isn't there a fundamental reason for this, Juho?  at least in the  
political realm where disparate ideas are competing for influence and  
power?  imagine a simple election between two candidates with Range or  
Score Voting.  who will voluntarily dilute their vote and not score  
their preferred candidate with the full 99 points (and the other  
candidate with 0)?  citizens with franchise consider themselves equal  
to each other with equal effect and the right to representation in a  
democratic government.  this is one reason why i usually say that the  
Range ballot requires too much information from the voter (the other  
reason is requiring to voter to agonize over whether he/she thinks  
some candidate is worth a grade of 46 or 51 or 60, they may as well  
just get out their dart board).  if i like Candidate A over Candidate  
B by just a little, and you like Candidate B over Candidate A by a  
great amount, why would i dilute my political preference to serve your  
political interest?  why *should* i?  i want to count (even with my  
tepid preference) just as much as you count.

and the Approval ballot asks for too little information from the voter  
and immediately presents the voter with a tactical dilemma if he/she  
likes a particular candidate but approves of more.  in my own State  
Senate district in Vermont, we *nearly* have Approval voting (we vote  
for at most 6 out of maybe 20 candidates and the 6 highest vote  
getters win state senate seats) and i have to consider each election  
how many candidates i will actually vote for.  i think human behavior  
will eventually drive Approval voting into the FPTP gutter.

the Ranked-order ballot, what is used for IRV or Condorcet or Borda,  
requires precisely the right amount of information from the voter:  
who, between any pair of candidates, do you prefer?  it does not ask  
how *much* you prefer one over the other, and i think that such is a  
useless question.

sorry if i took this off-topic.

BTW, Juho, i heard a BBC news story about your election tomorrow  
regarding the desirability of FPTP vs. proportional methods in  
electing Parliament.  so it sounds like that the UK, with its new Lib- 
Dem party, is also being confronted by the same problems.  i don't  
quite get it, though.  aren't MPs elected out of geographic  
districts?  are there more than one MP elected in any given district?   
if it's only one MP per district, how can a proportional method be  
used?  how can the losing votes in one district be transferred to  
another district to help elect someone there?  you would *have* to  
have more than one candidate elected per district with all candidates  
running at large, no?  if it's one MP per district, it's a single- 
winner election (and then, of course, i would advocate for Condorcet,  
in a 3+ party context).

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."