[EM] . Re: Why Not Condorcet?

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

> From: Kevin Venzke
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why Not Condorcet?

>
> Hi Robert,
>
> --- En date de?: Mer 12.5.10, robert bristow-johnson
> a ?crit?:
> > On May 12, 2010, at 7:40 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >
> > > I think approval-completed Condorcet is a better
> > proposal because there's
> > > a greater chance people would understand how it
> > works.
> >
> > what exactly is that?? the winner being the candidate
> > in the Smith set with the most 1st-choice votes?
>
> My preference is that when there is no CW, the candidate with
> the most
> votes in any position is elected. But you could limit it to the Smith
> or Schwartz set.
>
> Kevin Venzke

Approval//Smith has a big obvious seam where Condorcet and Approval are sewn
together.  A simple seamless method that accomplishes essentially the same thing
(only better) is Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA):

Initialize a variable X as the approval winner.  While X is uncovered, replace X
with the highest approval candidate that covers X.  Elect the final value of X.

The only time when MEA fails to elect the highest approval Smith candidate C is
when some other Smith candidate X covers C, i.e. when X beats C pairwise and
also beats every candidate that C beats pairwise.

Forest