[EM] Scenario where IRV and Asset outperform Condorcet, Range, Bucklin, Approval.

[Jameson Quinn]

> Strategy is bad. I recently gave a list of a number of different ways. It's
> bad for legitimacy - that is, those who feel the system has cheated them
> from their rightful win could try to overthrow the government or replace the
> voting system with plurality or something crazy like that. It's bad for
> cohesion: RC and M would soon be at each others' throats, unable to
> cooperate on their large common ground, and even within each camp, there
> would be acrimony between strategic and nonstrategic voters. It's bad for
> utility - the 52/48 split in the example is small, but you can easily adjust
> the numbers to widen it. It's bad for expressiveness: with strategy, it's
> impossible to tell if the RC voters honestly prefer M over R or L, or if
> they don't, and knowing the truth of that matter has some intrinsic value.
> And it's bad because it self-reinforces: strategy begets strategy, and all
> of the above bad effects are multiplied.
>
> Oh, and one more thing: strategy gives a systematic bias for
hyperpartisans, and I'd argue that's unhealthy. (There are already enough
such biases).

JQ
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