[EM] [CES #8848] Re: MAV on electowiki

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Jun 20 09:48:36 PDT 2013

>  Separately: I don't understand why you insist that "D" is an unapproved
>> grade. I have never treated it as anything but just another grade.
>> Obviously, any candidate who won with a "D" rating would have a very weak
>> mandate.
> ...It's a mess. Keep it simple.

Right. That means, no special separate rules for "D".

> GPA ratings.

Right. That means D is a 1.

> 1 is below an "expected result approval cutoff."


First, you're the one insisting that the system be analyzable using
Score/Average. But analyzing any set of ballots using a system other than
the one they were cast under is always going to be a questionable
proposition. If it doesn't work, let it go; keep it simple.

Second, if you believe that D will be the winning median, and there is some
candidate with three times the utility of your preferred frontrunner, it is
perfectly honest and rational and utility-consistent to vote your preferred
frontrunner at "D" as an approved vote.

It becomes useful for Condorcet analysis, especially. And it can be used in
> a tiebreak. It can be used in study of voting system results. It can be
> used in runoff nomination rules.

Thank you for making my point. "D" has some value. And so does keeping the
rules simple.

> Or it can be unused because unexpressed on the ballot, simpler system.
> Tiebreak can still be sum-of-votes, among majority-approved candidates.

This is better for honest votes, but worse for the chicken dilemma. The
system already does pretty well with honest votes, so fixing the chicken
dilemma is more important. And anyway, that would be a different system.

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