[EM] [CES #8848] Re: MAV on electowiki

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Jun 20 22:22:39 PDT 2013

>  Classic approval strategy suggests approving all candidates above the
> expected election value. We've seen that advised again and again.

Right. Which is not necessarily the same as the average of the best and
worst candidates, even in the zero-knowledge case.

That's a flaw in your logic. But it's a minor one. The bigger problem is
that you are stuck inside your logic, and simply cannot see things another
way. Ask a normal person if grade D should be allowed; they'll say "why
not?". Ask them what numbers ABCDF should correspond to; they'll say
"43210". Ask them if there should be special rules to make D an unapproved
rank; they'll say "huh? You're confusing me."

If you really want to analyze this as a Score ballot, I agree, the
approved-unapproved gap between D and F should be larger than other gaps.
Fine; for that analysis, which most people will not care about, make F
equal -2. Do not put extra rules into the system, making it seem more
complex. People will rightly suspect that if you have to make things
complex, you're either hiding something, or dealing with a delicate and
finicky system that needs careful fine-tuning, or both.


It is *offensive* to disregard the additional approvals after counting
> them.

But you're not disregarding them, any more than you are disregarding the
first round results when you run a runoff. Getting a majority is necessary
in order to be eligible to win. And as to *offensive*: you're stating an
idiosyncratic judgment as a universal fact. No voting system is perfect,
and if you start getting *offended* by any perceived flaw, you're probably
forgetting how bad plurality is.


> Counting them at fractional vote value allows them to be considered at a
> deprecated value, which is accurate as far as utility expression is
> concerned. That deprecation ameliorates an *exactly appropriate amount of
> the chicken dilemma." The error from overenthusiastic approval, which is
> what causes multiple majorities to appear, is *reduced* to an accurate
> representation of preference strength.
> So we have a hybrid between seeking majority approval, and seeking utility
> maximization. Voters will be more likely to add votes at lower preference,
> knowing that they are *less likely* to cause the election of a
> more-preferred candidate.
> If D votes are allowed, I'd complete the Bucklin amalgamation at D. If no
> majority has been found, then if the election must complete, I'd consider
> pairwise analysis using those D votes, or better, in theory, sum of scores.
> Pure Range.
> Be there or be square.
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