[EM] [CES #8848] Re: MAV on electowiki

[Jameson Quinn]

Could we do this on the wiki itself? That's what talk pages and BRD (Bold
edit, Revert, Discuss) are for.

Separately: I don't understand why you insist that "D" is an unapproved
grade. I have never treated it as anything but just another grade.
Obviously, any candidate who won with a "D" rating would have a very weak
mandate.

Jameson

2013/6/19 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com>

> At 12:33 PM 6/19/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> My general response to Abd: a number of good points, and a number where
>> I'd disagree. Tough to respond to a kitchen-sink list, so I'll try to
>> prioritize. Unfortunately that means that things I don't respond to could
>> be either "you're right" or "I disagree but don't think it's a productive
>> argument".
>>
>
> Aw, we are building something. Some pieces may be incomplete, that's to be
> expected.
>
> To keep this all in context, this is a discussion of an article:
> http://wiki.electorama.com/w/**index.php?title=Majority_**
> Approval_Voting&oldid=10169<http://wiki.electorama.com/w/index.php?title=Majority_Approval_Voting&oldid=10169>
>
> Current link (has been changed): http://wiki.electorama.com/**
> wiki/Majority_Approval_Voting<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Majority_Approval_Voting>
>
> I see and acknowledge that Jameson has already responded to certain
> comments of mine by editing the article accordingly. Now, to what he wrote:
>
>
>  2013/6/19 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <<mailto:abd at lomaxdesign.com>a**
>> bd at lomaxdesign.com <abd at lomaxdesign.com>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>> If one or more candidate has a majority, then the highest majority wins.
>>
>>
>> Arrghh. That is ordinary Bucklin.
>>
>>
>> Just for the first rank, because at that point there's no higher rank to
>> fall back to.
>>
>
> Ah. The full text:
>
>  Voters rate each candidate into one of a predefined set of ratings or
>> grades, such as the letter grades "A", "B", "C", "D", and "F". As with any
>> Bucklin system, first the top-grade ("A") votes for each candidate are
>> counted as approvals. If one or more candidate has a majority, then the
>> highest majority wins.
>>
>
> Yes, it's stated that this is related to the first rank, but, even knowing
> the process, I misread it. Maybe I misread it because I know the process....
>
> There is extra language here, and missing language that would make the
> matter clearer. For example, "predefined" is unnecessary, voters would not
> even think of being able to define the categories. So they will assume
> "predefined," and it need not be stated. The neutral concept is
> "categories." That also, by the way, fits with what Dr. Arrow has been
> saying of late.
>
> Further, multiple majorities in the first round is exceedingly unlikely.
> Thus we are leading with what would be a rare exception. That's to be
> avoided.
>
> I suggesting first describing the basic Bucklin amalgamation. This *is* a
> Bucklin method, and has a basic method that is followed. The case of
> multiple majorities is an exception, handled as such. It will almost always
> happen at a lower rank than first rank. First rank was called, "first
> choice," which is decent language.
>
> I'm narrowing down the method, here. I have, for a first proposal,
> eliminated the unapproved category ("D") entirely. It simplifies the
> explanation. I say:
>
> ----
> Majority Approval Voting (MAV) is an evaluative version of Bucklin voting.
> Voters rate or vote for each candidate, using a set of preference
> categories, from "first choice" down to a lowest-choice that is expressed
> by leaving the vote for the candidate blank. All votes excplicitly cast are
> forms of approval and may directly cause the election of the approved
> candidate.
>
> Voters may place as many candidates as they choose into each category.
>
> The categories are canvassed, being summed as approvals, and as needed,
> through the first rank to the third rank. This process ceases when any
> candidate has accumulated approvals from more than half of the voters. If
> there is only one such candidate, this candidate wins. If there is no such
> candidate, or if there are two or more such candidates, the process enters
> "tiebreak."
>
> If there is no majority-approved candidate, deterministic MAV is a
> plurality method, it can elect without an explicit majority. The ranks are
> evaluated as scores of 4, 3, 2, 1 (and 0 for blanks). The scores are summed
> and the candidate with the highest score wins.
>
> If there are two or more candidates with a majority, the majority-approved
> candidate with the highest sum of scores is elected.
> ----
>
> This is a compromise between the back-up used in the first MAV proposal,
> and the highest vote standard that would be ordinary Bucklin. This causes
> lower-ranked votes to be devalued, down to a half-vote, when there is a
> majority conflict. It leaves the number of expressed ranks as three,
> keeping it simple. This could be improved at the cost of a lower rank: the
> D rank, which would only be used for tiebreak. This method introduces, more
> explicitly, Score Voting.
>
> What made me uncomfortable about the "backup" method of breaking a tie in
> median vote was the effective disregard of votes cast in the
> multiple-majority producing round.
>
> There is a possible legal problem when votes are cast that are not
> counted. In some places, the pure Bucklin method might be *legally
> required,* because, as in Arizona, the constitution may require a
> preponderance of legal votes, and we would be hard-pressed to claim that
> lower-ranked votes were not legal. Indeed, this may *require Range.* Or a
> runoff system.
>
>  At some point it must be specified how "rank overvotes" are handled.
>> There are possible ways:
>>
>> 1. Ballot is voided. We don't like that!
>> 2. Vote for candidate is voided. Also that is not great.
>> 3. Highest rating marked counts. (This may have been traditional Bucklin.
>> The instructions said "don't do it.")
>> 4. Lowest rating marked counts.
>> 5. Top and bottom ratings are averaged. (So a rating of A and B would
>> give a rating that could be called A- or B+. GPA contribution 3.5.)
>>
>>
>> 6. Vote counts for forming a majority at top rating, but doesn't count as
>> "higher than" until you pass bottom rating. This is actually strategically
>> attractive (if you were in a chicken dilemma, you could give the other side
>> an honest B, but also a chicken-conservative D or even F, and that would
>> basically be saying "I think playing chicken is silly but if it turns out
>> I'm in the minority then game on"), in keeping with the spirit of the
>> method, and in effect very similar to 5.
>>
>
> I don't understand this. I'd like those counting the votes to be able to
> determine the vote, period, right then, no questions, no "conditions." Any
> vote-counting that depends on conditions can then fail
> precinct-summability. Not good. Interpreting the vote as intermediate gives
> it a meaning that *averages* out to something close to what an erring voter
> intended, and that, done deliberately, increases voter flexibility.
>
> This is a minor detail, but introducing it from the beginning, in
> footnotes (which would be a sentence in a code implementation), establishes
> something that could be quite valuable later. How to increase the
> resolution of a Range ballot without increasing the number of categories.
> And the whole MAV/backup point is a concern made significant by "rapid
> collapse of approvals" caused by lack of refinement in expression.
>
>
>  But I think that pre-specifying this is premature. These are
>> implementation details, not part of the method.
>>
>
> That's correct. But it should be a part of any core document on MAV. Not
> leading, it's a detail.
>
>
>  I like the fifth option because it actually would allow voters to give an
>> intermediate rating, thus providing some additional range resolution with
>> no additional ballot complexity, but some cost in canvassing. That
>> additional cost would be small, because most voters would not use it, most
>> voters not needing it.
>>
>> In amalgamation, then, as to rank, 3.5 would be added in after A but
>> before B.
>>
>> This would convert a Range 4 ballot to Range 8, with the penultimate
>> bottom rating being missing, unless the bottom rating is explicit.
>>
>>
>> If not, votes at next grade down ("B") are added to each candidate's
>> approval scores. If there are one or more candidates with a majority, the
>> winner is whichever of those had more votes at higher grades (the previous
>> stage). If there were no majorities, then the next grade down ("C") is
>> added and the process repeats; and so on.
>>
>> Note that if this process continues without a majority until the last
>> grade ("F") is added, no new rules are needed.
>>
>>
>> This is technically correct, because the lowest grade amalgamation *must*
>> show 100%. This assumes an F default, so marking of F is *irrelevant*
>> except as a confirmation.
>>
>> If Fs are amalgamated with blanks not being treated as F, then F becomes
>> a vote for the bottom-rating candidate. We don't want to create that
>> confusion for a moment, even.
>>
>>
>> I agree that I should be more explicit about F default.
>>
>> For simplicity, dump the F rating entirely. It is assumed, an unexpressed
>> default rank.
>>
>>
>> I strongly disagree that there should be no explicit F. As redundant as
>> it seems to you, there are definitely voters who get satisfaction from
>> explicitly voting against someone, and I would never design a survey where
>> an explicit answer was always considered to connote more support than an
>> implicit "no".
>>
>
> They should know that it has no effect except as a slight difference in
> how the votes might be reported. Voters are *totally accustomed to
> not-voting for a candidate being rejection.* They will be even more
> experienced with this if they first have seen the simplest Approval
> implementations, i.e, Count All the Votes.
>
>
>  MAV as a method should not specifically depend on the number of ratings.
>>
>>
>> Absolutely agree. I'll make that even more explicit.
>>
>
> I'm now disagreeing somewhat with myself. We should have a Simple MAV
> method that is maximally simple. The challenge is to make this *also*
> maximally effective, to the extent possible with simpler rules and a
> simpler ballot.
>
>
>> MAV outside of a runoff system is a plurality method (as are all voting
>> systems that can complete without an *explicit* approval of a majority of
>> voters. In treating a midrange vote ("C", 2/4) as an approval, we have
>> already stretched *slightly* beyond that. Taking this down more deeply into
>> D/F waters is pretending a majority that doesn't exist.
>>
>>
>> OK, but in a non-runoff method, sometimes you'll elect without majority
>> support, and it's still fair to say that D is better than F.
>>
>> I can see more complex amalgamation rules that could use the D ratings.
>> The simplest rule, attempted here, doesn't cut it.
>>
>>
>> Any of those more complex rules is also trying to infer a majority from a
>> plurality. They might sometimes do a slightly better job of that, but my
>> feeling is that it's a false hope to think they'll always succeed, and so
>> KISS.
>>
>
> We would aim the method to *usually succeed.* Indeed, plurality methods do
> exactly this, and with nonpartisan elections, plurality *almost always*
> predicts the ultimate winner, were fuller ballots to be cast. And that is
> an argument, Jameson, for using preponderance of the votes. I.e, straight
> Bucklin. But there are also partisan elections. It may be that we will
> design a series of Simple MAV versions, for different environments.
>
> So we'd have Nonpartisan Simple MAV and Partisan Simple MAV, as examples.
>
>
>
>   Since by that point all grades will have been counted, all candidate
>> tallies will reach 100%.
>>
>>
>> In other words, amalgamating the F ratings is *useless*. This treats F as
>> if it were a majority, it's a multiple majority, so *unconditionally* the
>> previous ratings will be used and the F amalgamation will be ignored. So
>> why do we even count it?
>>
>> Just to make the system seem uniform all the way down?
>>
>> As I've mentioned, the system should exist in two forms: plurality
>> result, or runoff feeder (which, then, is also in two forms: conditional
>> runoff and unconditional runoff. Unconditional runoff may be better handled
>> with a different system, an explicitly multiwinner one, which has not yet
>> been examined in detail.)
>>
>>
>>  The process above then naturally elects the candidate with the most
>> approvals at the higher grades (D or above); that is, whichever has the
>> fewest F's.
>>
>>
>> And I would say, fewest disapprovals, and disapproval includes D and F.
>> It also includes blanks.
>>
>>
>> Great. Make your own, slightly more-complex system, and give it a
>> different name.
>>
>
> Nope. I'll make a less-complex system, and give it *this* name.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>  This is the best way to resolve such an election using only the
>> information on the given ballots.
>>
>>
>> "Best" is a red flag word when it has not been clearly defined. You'd
>> never be allowed to say "best" on Wikipedia, without that, and maybe even
>> with it. That's called a "peacock word."
>>
>>
>> OK. A way.
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
>>
>> Why would MAV be any "better" than Bucklin?
>>
>>
>> Wait a minute. In this particular case, MAV and "Bucklin" (you mean,
>> Grand Junction) do exactly the same thing: use second-to-bottom rank if
>> there are no majorities.
>>
>
> But with Bucklin, quite clearly, the second-to-bottom rank is an approved
> rank. In the system design just set up, by Jameson, the second-to-bottom
> rank is a disapproved rank, but then, is it?
>
>
>  From the information on the ballots, the plurality winner in the
>> majority-finding stage is arguably the "best winner." No, we support MAV
>> because of the effect on strategic voting. If we have a Bucklin system with
>> greater ballot resolution, MAV backup may be unnecessary. If voters are
>> more informed, it may be unnecessary.
>>
>>
>> You seem to be under the impression that there's a difference between MAV
>> and "Bucklin" in this case.
>>
>
> If I was, I must have misplaced it. I'm discussing the *entire method*,
> not just the one case. "Plurality winner" as I used the term, *includes the
> multiple majority case.* Plurality does also have the meaning of "the most
> votes."
>
>
>>
>> I am not satisfied that we have adequately examined the issues, to, yet,
>> proclaim MAV as the "best" system up from pure Approval.
>>
>>
>> Nope. I am not sure it's "best", and don't really care. I know that the
>> differences between Bucklin methods are tiny, yet we'll make no progress
>> until we settle on one, simple method.
>>
>
> Let's make it maximally simple. We are complicating Bucklin, there had
> better be *strong reason* for that. Bucklin, remember, was *very popular.*
> That is what is obvious from the history. It was killed *politically*. In
> disregard of what the voters actually wanted. Bucklin also may have been
> oversold. That's obvious from the history as well.
>
>
>>
>> This point should be clearly made, though: MAV is Bucklin, with an
>> exception only appearing in the handling of multiple majorities. Those will
>> tend to be rare, because, more common, we can expect in some kinds of
>> elections, will be majority failure.
>>
>> How majority failure is handled is a classic problem. Robert's Rules'
>> recommendation to organizations: Don't Do It! *Never* elect with a mere
>> plurality. The version of IRV that they described *requires* a true
>> majority (and even then, they point out the center squeeze problem.)
>>
>> The backup concept, treating multiple majorities as possibly indicating
>> over-rapid addition of approvals, is interesting, but looking at this is
>> causing me to warm to a graduated median method.... plus pushing toward
>> finer resolution, which will reduce the number of multiple majorities.
>> *None of this is going to be fully satisfactory, because making a decision
>> with a mere plurality is intrinsically problematic.*
>>
>>
>> Right. And the differences are slim. So let's keep debating these
>> technical points among ourselves, but use common language in our activism.
>> That's what this is about, principally.
>>
>
> Sure. So don't rush judgment, or any consensus won't be real.
>
>
>>
>> What I *don't* like with MAV is that a large majority can be ignored vs a
>> bare majority, based on the votes at the higher rating. Graduated median
>> amalgamation can balance this.
>>
>>
>> Right. For honest votes, GMJ is clearly superior. See above for why I
>> don't care.
>>
>
> But we can do better than GMJ, and it might be quite simple. That's what
> I've come to with this discussion, so far. GMJ, essentially, attempts to
> simulate a more graduate introduction of approvals. Yet we have range data,
> which is *superior*. That is, more likely to reflect social utility.
>
> Looking at this, keeping the votes at full value creates the problem of
> too-rapid introduction of approvals. Deprecating the votes to their utility
> expression, what the voters actually voted, in setting up their
> instant-runoff approval robot, their ballot, *partially* compensates for
> possible overenthusiastic introduction of additional approvals. It also can
> serve as a first introduction to range amalgamation.
>
>
>> But I have not seen a detailed examination of this issue, and it's
>> important.
>>
>>
>> No, it isn't.
>>
>
> Then, Jameson, you are welcome to sit out the discussion.
>
>
>> The MAV backup may be just a bit *too* simple. There is an alternative,
>> as well, that would pick the candidate with the highest GPA. That would
>> consider *all* the ratings. It's theoretically superior, because it would
>> be Range. The D ratings would count.
>>
>> Another approach would use pairwise comparison. We *do* have explicit
>> approvals of a majority, if the median vote is C or higher. So, then the
>> ballots would be recanvassed to see how the majority-approved candidates
>> fare against each other. The collapsed approvals are separate again. This
>> would make the method Condorcet-compliant, if I'm correct. And that would
>> be a plus. I'm on board the concept that the Condorcet criterion is not
>> absolute, because of social utility, but without explicit majority
>> confirmation, I dislike finding *against* the preference of a majority.
>>
>>
>>  However, in this and other cases of multiple majorities, a runoff, if
>> feasible, would be a better way to ensure a clean majority win.
>>
>>
>> It's a *way*. Not simply a "better" one. The alternative presented here
>> is *not* a way to "ensure a clean majority win."
>>
>>
>> In my book, not putting your hand in a band saw is a "better" way not to
>> cut it off. That is, "a way" is better than "not a way".
>>
>
> Don't do that.
>
>
>
>
>  This system was promoted and named due to the confusing array of Bucklin
>> and Median proposals.
>>
>>
>> Premature. It has not been promoted. It has been *tentatively* named.
>> This, by the way, would be in a History section of an article, and it only
>> begins to tell the history.
>>
>>  It is intended to be a relatively generic, simple Bucklin option with
>> good resistance to the <<http://wiki.electorama.com/**
>> wiki/Chicken_dilemma <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_dilemma>>
>> http://**wiki.electorama.com/wiki/**Chicken_dilemma<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Chicken_dilemma>>chicken
>> dilemma. It was named by a <<http://lists.electorama.com/**
>> pipermail/election-methods-**electorama.com/2013-June/**031938.html<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-June/031938.html>
>> >http://lists.**electorama.com/pipermail/**election-methods-electorama.**
>> com/2013-June/031938.html<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-June/031938.html>>poll
>> on the electorama mailing list in June 2013.
>>
>>
>>
>> Geez, *recentism* to the 9s.
>>
>> You know what I think about the "chicken dilemma." (Voting is not a game
>> of chicken, and "dilemma" is merely an ordinary problem in strategy, which
>> only afflicts a small segment of the population, the rest will simply
>> *vote.*) What MAV will do is to, I expect, *slightly increase* the number
>> of additional approvals, because they become *safer*, i.e., less likely to
>> cause the loss of the favorite to the lower ranked candidate.
>>
>> I prefer, Jameson, that the issue of the exact definition of MAV be *left
>> open* for the time being. Let "Majority Approval Voting" actually be
>> Supermajority Approval Voting," i.e, ultimately approved by a supermajority
>> of voting systems activists.
>>
>> Not as the "ideal voting system," which it is not, but as the "ideal next
>> step beyond ordinary Approval, in a plurality context." It introduces a
>> ranked/rated ballot. It's simple to amalgamate and understand. In most
>> elections, the "tiebreaker" procedure is not activated. Indeed, in most
>> elections under some fairly common conditions, there will be majority
>> *failure*, not the multiple majorities that the backup procedure handles.
>>
>> The grades or ranks for this system could be numbers instead of letter
>> grades. Terms such as "graded MAV" or "rated MAV" can be used to
>> distinguish these possibilities if necessary. In either case, descriptive
>> labels for the ratings or grades are recommended. For instance, for the
>> letter grades:
>>    * A: Unconditional support
>>    * B: Support if there are no other majorities above "C"
>>    * C: Support if there are no other majorities above "D"
>>    * D: Oppose unless there are no other majorities at all.
>>    * F: Unconditional opposition.
>>
>> This treats D as an approval, so it divides the approved categories into
>> four rather than the three from Bucklin. We will need, ultimately, a
>> single, coherent, simple system to propose and try. Notice that the
>> definitions treat not-oppose as support. In my analysis of the traditional
>> Bucklin ballot, it's clear that the 3rd rank was *minimum approval.* The
>> ordinary meaning of a grade of "D" is a kind of failure.
>>
>>
>> In most schools, you can pass with a "D".
>>
>
> If you don't get too many. Want to show that report card to prospective
> employers? Cs are bad enough.
>
>
>>
>> This is a *really complicated* explanation of the rating levels.
>>
>>
>> It's also accurate.
>>
>
> Somewhat. Better than putting your hand in a band saw.
>
>
>>
>> As the above labels indicate, support at the middle grades or ratings is
>> not partial, as in <<http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/Score_voting<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Score_voting>
>> >http://wiki.**electorama.com/wiki/Score_**voting<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Score_voting>>Score
>> voting, but conditional.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is correct. If the method terminates above the rating, it is not
>> used. That, by the way, is a flaw, from a social utility point of view. I
>> don't like that voters may be casting votes that are not counted. I'm
>> starting to think toward lines of using range amalgamation in the
>> "tiebreaker." And of suggesting that all votes be counted, even if only for
>> reporting. Incubator effect.
>>
>>
>> Count and report all grades: of course.
>> Votes counting fully is a flaw: It gives less social utility for honest
>> votes, but by doing less to encourage exaggerated votes, it could result in
>> better information and thus better social utility overall.
>>
>
> There is a myth out there, called "exaggerated votes." No, voters vote
> their preferences, and "exaggeration" is an oxymoron. It's just a mark on a
> piece of paper, perhaps. If the voter starts screaming at the voting place,
> "You *have to* vote for X and against everyone else," so that they cart him
> off, that would be, perhaps, an exaggeration. Or would it? Presumably, that
> was the way he felt!
>
>   That is the basic premise of median versus average.
>>
>
> And that is exactly why median can fail to maximize utility. It suppresses
> much voter information. The particular median called "majority approval,"
> however, has a *different value,* having to do with fundamental democratic
> process.
>
>   Like it or not, that is what MAV gives you. And MAV can do a lot better
>> at giving that than "maybe we should do this, or maybe that, no wait I just
>> thought of another thing..."
>>
>
> A few weeks discussion, Jameson, is not this. Hey, if you think we are
> done, you are free to go ahead with whatever. Just without my support,
> perhaps, and that may or may not mean anything. I might even support what
> you do. But do consider the value of *full consensus*. It can be well worth
> seeking.
>
> And by "full consensus," I don't mean that most people simply got tired of
> discussing it and stood aside. Listlessly.
>
>
>>
>>
>>  That is, the typical ballot will still count fully for or against a
>> given candidate.
>>
>>
>> Yeah. But I want to see a much more detailed analysis of this.
>>
>>
>> The different grade levels are a way to help the voting system figure out
>> how far to extend that support so that some candidate gets a majority.
>>
>>
>> Uh, really? It's more like "so that majority support is found if possible
>> from the votes."
>>
>>
>> OK, sure.
>>
>
> By the way, my objection was to the implication that a majority would be
> found. Obviously, by extending amalgamation down to the bottom rating, we
> could find, not merely a majority, but *unanimity.* And it would be
> meaningless.
>
>
>> And a D vote is *not* "support." It might be a weak stand-aside. "Okay,
>> if the rest of you insist, this one is better than that one." A strong
>> stand-aside would be a C vote. In consider C as neutral, as to preference
>> strength. So-so. Not good, not bad. "Passing," but barely. No honors. But
>> ... might be serviceable.
>>
>>
>> For a strategic voter, the most important ratings are the top ("A"),
>> second-to-bottom ("D"), and bottom ("F").
>>
>>
>> "Most important" is, again, Peacock. Here, Jameson, you are giving your
>> own analysis, not the community's analysis.
>>
>>
>> OK. Section name: "Preliminary and tentative strategic analysis".
>>
>
>
> And attributed, and others may make contributions.
>
>
>> This is not a signed article, even if your name is in the History. If you
>> want to present your own analysis, *attribute it.* Or attribute analysis to
>> others. I suggest not presenting your own opinions as if they were fact.
>> Sometimes in writing Wikipedia articles, I'd use "weasel words." This is
>> weak language, like, "Some say that ...." or "It could be claimed that
>> ...." or "According to some sources, ...." I really only did that to find
>> quick consensus, not to propose weasel language as stable or desirable. It
>> was typically replacing *strong language* that did not actually reflect
>> consensus.
>>
>>
>> A typical zero-knowledge strategy would be to give the best 30% of
>> candidates an "A", the next 25% a "D", and the bottom 45% an "F".
>>
>>
>> "Typical" according to what standard? What population? I would *not*
>> think this way *at all.*
>>
>>
>> "Strategic" means at a minimum "game-theoretic equilibrium". Your
>> suggestion is certainly not that, so it is not "strategic", it is "honest".
>>
>
> I've done the research, Jameson. Your comment is naive. Game theoretical
> analysis is often hampered by overspecification of the goals of the player.
> Honest voting in the zero-knowledge case can be, with some voter goals, the
> minimum you speak of. This has been examined in some detail, Jameson.
> Warren Smith even signed on to the article, and extended it a little.
>
>
>> I would cast a Range ballot, period, using the same strategy, i.e.,
>> considering what I know of the preferences of others. With Bucklin, I can
>> vote sincerely for my favorite under almost all conditions, and the loss of
>> voting power is miniscule. If it's a zero-knowledge situation, I'd vote
>> simple, normalized Range. I'm really not worried about the multiple
>> majority problem. My votes will represent *true preference strength*. That
>> only shifts with knowledge of the electorate, where I will then vote Von
>> Neumann - Morgenstern utilities. I.e., to put it simply, which will
>> powerfully choose between realistic possibilities, reserving *some voting
>> power* for the expression of true preference, which is an independent
>> value. (And where partisan elections are involved, that has a long-term
>> effect. I am not just concerned about the *present election.*)
>>
>>
>> Great analysis of why an honest vote is a good idea in this system.
>>
>
> Thanks. I came up with a result that suggested that an optimal range vote
> (i.e., "honest") was *not* strategically harmful. There could be *some
> harm* if the vote was not *accurate*, this was not studied. That could be
> fixed by *exaggerating* the vote to cancel out error, I'd suspect. It would
> not need to be exaggerated all the way to max/min range. But the argument I
> give above suggests a *different value* that could swamp the naive game
> theory of the situation. After all, I will have to live with myself and my
> vote and the consequences, whereas the *actual probablility* of my vote
> affecting the outcome, in public elections, is so small as to be
> ridiculous. Game theory often has been used to suggest that voting at all
> is a waste of time, effort, and money. And it would be, if not for these
> additional values.
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20130619/7b915c23/attachment-0004.htm>