[EM] Sortition and the Delegable Proxy system

Bryan Mills bmills at alumni.cmu.edu
Tue Jan 31 06:47:24 PST 2012

On Jan 31, 2012 3:17 AM, "Clinton Mead" <clintonmead at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 7:13 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:
>> On 01/31/2012 07:14 AM, Clinton Mead wrote:
>>> Why not simply IRV until 500 candidates are left.
>> STV would probably be better - or if you want a weighted assembly,
continuous cumulative voting (which is like RV except every ballot's rating
is divided by the sum of the undivided ratings on that ballot).
> Why STV? The original poster wanted elected representatives to have votes
proportional to their electoral support yes? There's no need for fractional
transfers from elected candidates then.

IRV is a form of STV, but it's not my favorite.  Some of the other STV
methods (e.g. Schulze-STV and CPO-STV) tend to produce better eliminations.

But the question of why not STV is a good one.  Several reasons.

STV requires much more work on the part of the voter - ranking all the way
down to a candidate likely to be elected, instead of just one.  That
probably means a much larger ballot and/or an arbitrary cutoff between
ballot-candidates and write-in candidates.

The STV variants that are less strategy-prone are computationally
inefficient, and even those are not strategy-free.

And perhaps most importantly, the more resistant an STV method is to
strategy, the more complicated it is to explain and understand.

As deterministic methods go, I do like STV methods; but DS fixes a lot of
the worries I have about them.
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