[EM] Unger, wrt tabulation.

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>

>
>
> On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>
>>>>
>>>>> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
>>>>> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
>>>>> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported
>>>>> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,
>>>>> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,
>>>>> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the
>>>>> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.
>>>>>
>>>>> Steve
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be
>>> tabulated at the precinct level.  You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates
>>> and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists.  You then sort the
>>> votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists.  But if the
>>> third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of
>>> each other then it would not require a manual recount.  The IRV cd be done
>>> with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the
>>> 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a
>>> different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely.
>>>
>>
>> This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a
>> truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one.
>>
>
> Explain to me what you mean by that?
>
> The summing of rankings in the first stage is O(N), right?
> The summing of the number of votes in each of the 10 categories is O(N),
> right?
>

Yes. You can either do it in two rounds, or one round that's O(N^3). Either
way, it's more than twice as hard as a one-round, O(N) count.


>  The rest is a simple EXCEL spreadsheet problem.
>>
>
>
>> And it's the only advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center
>> squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington still applies at full force
>>
>
> Unless, their full force isn't that strong in real life with a dynamic
> center and regular repositioning by parties.  And a 20% chance of "sour
> grapes" non-monotonicity in the infrequent case of a three-way competitive
> race isn't enuf to change voter behavior significantly.  And once again,
> Burlington has gotta be downscaled in its significance given the small
> margin with which IRV was rescinded and the deceptive campaign waged
> against it, and the likelihood that it's pathologies would have been easily
> worked out with time...
>
> Earth to EM, Burlington is not a smoking gun...
>

Earth to David. Reality doesn't care how often you repeat nice-sounding
phrases about how you think IRV would usually work. Unless you give reality
a chance to change you're mind, you're just fooling yourself.

Jameson

> dlw
>
>>
>>  Jameson
>>
>>>
>>> dlw
>>>
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>>>
>>
>
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