# [EM] Unger, wrt tabulation.

David L Wetzell wetzelld at gmail.com
Thu Feb 2 09:54:42 PST 2012

```On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
> 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>
>>
>>
>> 2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>
>>>
>>>> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
>>>> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
>>>> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported
>>>> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,
>>>> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,
>>>> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the
>>>> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.
>>>>
>>>> Steve
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be
>> tabulated at the precinct level.  You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates
>> and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists.  You then sort the
>> votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists.  But if the
>> third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of
>> each other then it would not require a manual recount.  The IRV cd be done
>> with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the
>> 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a
>> different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely.
>>
>
> This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a
> truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one.
>

Explain to me what you mean by that?

The summing of rankings in the first stage is O(N), right?
The summing of the number of votes in each of the 10 categories is O(N),
right?

> The rest is a simple EXCEL spreadsheet problem.
>

> And it's the only advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center
> squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington still applies at full force
>

Unless, their full force isn't that strong in real life with a dynamic
center and regular repositioning by parties.  And a 20% chance of "sour
grapes" non-monotonicity in the infrequent case of a three-way competitive
race isn't enuf to change voter behavior significantly.  And once again,
Burlington has gotta be downscaled in its significance given the small
margin with which IRV was rescinded and the deceptive campaign waged
against it, and the likelihood that it's pathologies would have been easily
worked out with time...

Earth to EM, Burlington is not a smoking gun...
dlw

>
> Jameson
>
>>
>> dlw
>>
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>>
>>
>
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