[EM] Unger, wrt tabulation.

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>

>
>
> 2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>
>>
>>> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
>>> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
>>> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported
>>> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,
>>> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,
>>> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the
>>> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.
>>>
>>> Steve
>>>
>>
>>
> I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be
> tabulated at the precinct level.  You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates
> and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists.  You then sort the
> votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists.  But if the
> third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of
> each other then it would not require a manual recount.  The IRV cd be done
> with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the
> 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a
> different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely.
>

This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a
truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one. And it's the only
advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington
still applies at full force.

Jameson

>
> dlw
>
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