<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div class="im">On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com" target="_blank">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
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<br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div>2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com" target="_blank">wetzelld@gmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:unger@cs.columbia.edu" target="_blank">unger@cs.columbia.edu</a>></span><br>
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A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote<br>
tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual<br>
processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported<br>
results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,<br>
costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,<br>
even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the<br>
other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.<br>
<br>
Steve<br></blockquote><div> </div></div></div></blockquote><div>I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be tabulated at the precinct level. You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists. You then sort the votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists. But if the third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of each other then it would not require a manual recount. The IRV cd be done with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely.</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div></div></div><div>This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>
</div><div><div>Explain to me what you mean by that? </div><div><br></div><div>The summing of rankings in the first stage is O(N), right? </div><div>The summing of the number of votes in each of the 10 categories is O(N), right? </div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes. You can either do it in two rounds, or one round that's O(N^3). Either way, it's more than twice as hard as a one-round, O(N) count.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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The rest is a simple EXCEL spreadsheet problem.</div></blockquote></div><div class="im"><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div>And it's the only advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington still applies at full force</div>
</div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>Unless, their full force isn't that strong in real life with a dynamic center and regular repositioning by parties. And a 20% chance of "sour grapes" non-monotonicity in the infrequent case of a three-way competitive race isn't enuf to change voter behavior significantly. And once again, Burlington has gotta be downscaled in its significance given the small margin with which IRV was rescinded and the deceptive campaign waged against it, and the likelihood that it's pathologies would have been easily worked out with time...</div>
<div> </div><div>Earth to EM, Burlington is not a smoking gun...</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Earth to David. Reality doesn't care how often you repeat nice-sounding phrases about how you think IRV would usually work. Unless you give reality a chance to change you're mind, you're just fooling yourself.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Jameson </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><div>dlw</div></font></span><div class="im">
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<div>Jameson</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class="gmail_quote"><span><font color="#888888">
<div><br></div><div>dlw</div></font></span></div>
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