[EM] Unger, wrt tabulation.
David L Wetzell
wetzelld at gmail.com
Thu Feb 2 11:16:39 PST 2012
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 12:21 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>
> 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <unger at cs.columbia.edu>
>>>>>
>>>>>> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
>>>>>> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
>>>>>> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported
>>>>>> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome,
>>>>>> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that,
>>>>>> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the
>>>>>> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Steve
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be
>>>> tabulated at the precinct level. You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates
>>>> and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists. You then sort the
>>>> votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists. But if the
>>>> third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of
>>>> each other then it would not require a manual recount. The IRV cd be done
>>>> with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the
>>>> 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a
>>>> different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a
>>> truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one.
>>>
>>
>> Explain to me what you mean by that?
>>
>> The summing of rankings in the first stage is O(N), right?
>> The summing of the number of votes in each of the 10 categories is O(N),
>> right?
>>
>
> Yes. You can either do it in two rounds, or one round that's O(N^3).
> Either way, it's more than twice as hard as a one-round, O(N) count.
>
It's not twice as hard. You just need to tally things up twice.
That's small potatoes.
>
>
>> The rest is a simple EXCEL spreadsheet problem.
>>>
>>
>>
>>> And it's the only advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center
>>> squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington still applies at full force
>>>
>>
>> Unless, their full force isn't that strong in real life with a dynamic
>> center and regular repositioning by parties. And a 20% chance of "sour
>> grapes" non-monotonicity in the infrequent case of a three-way competitive
>> race isn't enuf to change voter behavior significantly. And once again,
>> Burlington has gotta be downscaled in its significance given the small
>> margin with which IRV was rescinded and the deceptive campaign waged
>> against it, and the likelihood that it's pathologies would have been easily
>> worked out with time...
>>
>> Earth to EM, Burlington is not a smoking gun...
>>
>
> Earth to David. Reality doesn't care how often you repeat nice-sounding
> phrases about how you think IRV would usually work. Unless you give reality
> a chance to change you're mind, you're just fooling yourself.
>
I do change my mind. The fact I haven't wrt IRV is because I got a good
case and it is a huge non sequitur to presume that "the" solution to the
US's political problems is for it to become an EU-style multi-party
system....
Didn't you read RBJ's rebuke to your over-the-top rhetoric wrt IRV???
Y'all are trying to justify the large amount of time spent playing with
complicated single-winner election rules when the truth is that such is not
a pressing question for US_American electoral reform.
dlw
>
> Jameson
>
>> dlw
>>
>>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>>>
>>>> dlw
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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