[EM] An ABE solution

[Jameson Quinn]

That's weaker than the FBC. The FBC says you shouldn't have to betray your
favorite to get a result you prefer, not that you shouldn't have to betray
your favorite to get your favorite.

To restate it in Kristofer's terms:
Say an election elects X != Y. Now take a ballot which does not rate Y top
or equal-top. There must be some way to replace that with a ballot which
ranks Y top or equal-top and still get an election which elects either X or
Y.

That is, for any result you can get with favorite betrayal, either you can
get that same result without favorite betrayal, or you can get your
favorite without favorite betrayal.

I do like having this "backwards" formulation of the criterion; it might
make proving FBC easier in some cases. So thank you, Kristofer, for the
idea.

Jameson

2011/11/23 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>

> Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> I don't agree that "Sincere Favorite" is practically equivalent to the
>> FBC. The FBC is about not having to lower your one favorite candidate; it
>> is not about not having to pick a single favorite from your favorite set.
>> As a voter, I'd regard the former as a serious dilemma, and the latter as a
>> trivial detail.
>>
>
> Would this work as a votes-only variant of FBC?
>
> "If Y currently wins, then you shouldn't be able to make Y lose by
> replacing some ballots where Y is ranked below top with ballots where Y is
> ranked at top and the other candidates are in arbitrary order".
>
> That's a mirror image criterion: consider the ballots after modification
> to be the voters' sincere ballots. Then the ballots before modification are
> strategic ones where the voters in question compromised to get Y to win. If
> the method passes FBC, the voters shouldn't have to alter their ballots in
> any way that moves Y below top - and if a method passes this criterion, for
> any pair of ballot sets that could be interpreted as this happening, Y wins
> in both cases.
>
>
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