[EM] An ABE solution

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Jameson Quinn wrote:
> That's weaker than the FBC. The FBC says you shouldn't have to betray 
> your favorite to get a result you prefer, not that you shouldn't have to 
> betray your favorite to get your favorite.
> 
> To restate it in Kristofer's terms:
> Say an election elects X != Y. Now take a ballot which does not rate Y 
> top or equal-top. There must be some way to replace that with a ballot 
> which ranks Y top or equal-top and still get an election which elects 
> either X or Y.
> 
> That is, for any result you can get with favorite betrayal, either you 
> can get that same result without favorite betrayal, or you can get your 
> favorite without favorite betrayal.

That may still be incorrect, now that you mention it. Say your honest 
preference is A>B>C>D>E=F, and that in the "baseline" case (where you 
don't vote A, B, C, or D top), D wins. Then if rearranging your ballot 
so that A is at top makes C win, then neither D nor A won after the 
rearranging, yet C winning is an outcome you prefer, so that shouldn't 
fail the FBC.