[EM] An ABE solution

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/23 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>

> Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> That's weaker than the FBC. The FBC says you shouldn't have to betray
>> your favorite to get a result you prefer, not that you shouldn't have to
>> betray your favorite to get your favorite.
>>
>> To restate it in Kristofer's terms:
>> Say an election elects X != Y. Now take a ballot which does not rate Y
>> top or equal-top. There must be some way to replace that with a ballot
>> which ranks Y top or equal-top and still get an election which elects
>> either X or Y.
>>
>> That is, for any result you can get with favorite betrayal, either you
>> can get that same result without favorite betrayal, or you can get your
>> favorite without favorite betrayal.
>>
>
> That may still be incorrect, now that you mention it. Say your honest
> preference is A>B>C>D>E=F, and that in the "baseline" case (where you don't
> vote A, B, C, or D top), D wins. Then if rearranging your ballot so that A
> is at top makes C win, then neither D nor A won after the rearranging, yet
> C winning is an outcome you prefer, so that shouldn't fail the FBC.
>
> Sorry, I was unclear. In your example, there must be some A-top ballot
where D or A wins (because what if your real preference is A>D>everyone
else?). That doesn't mean that there cannot be any A-top ballot where C
wins. So based on the information given, the method in that example has not
yet failed the FBC. (Unless all possible A-top ballots make C win).

Jameson
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