[EM] An ABE solution

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I don't agree that "Sincere Favorite" is practically equivalent to the 
> FBC. The FBC is about not having to lower your one favorite candidate; 
> it is not about not having to pick a single favorite from your favorite 
> set. As a voter, I'd regard the former as a serious dilemma, and the 
> latter as a trivial detail.

Would this work as a votes-only variant of FBC?

"If Y currently wins, then you shouldn't be able to make Y lose by 
replacing some ballots where Y is ranked below top with ballots where Y 
is ranked at top and the other candidates are in arbitrary order".

That's a mirror image criterion: consider the ballots after modification 
to be the voters' sincere ballots. Then the ballots before modification 
are strategic ones where the voters in question compromised to get Y to 
win. If the method passes FBC, the voters shouldn't have to alter their 
ballots in any way that moves Y below top - and if a method passes this 
criterion, for any pair of ballot sets that could be interpreted as this 
happening, Y wins in both cases.