[EM] Kristofer: MMPO bad-example

[Dave Ketchum]

On Nov 19, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> MTA? CD? 1CM?
>
> Also, although I happen to understand them, FBC, LNHa, SFC, 3P, ABE,  
> and RCW. Cut-and-pastes from old email messages are fine. I've done  
> 4 or 5 abbreviation pages , at least 2 of which I've never used  
> myself, so I think it's fair to start asking the people who are  
> relying on the abbreviations to do the work themselves.

It would help if, when continuing a conversation, talkers would help  
readers connect the parts by the "subject" staying the same or, at  
least, having the previous subject referenced in the body.

Passing out abbreviation pages would help if their "subject" made them  
findable.

Note that one detail in this conversation is sorting out the meaning  
of the various identifiers such as ABE.

Dave Ketchum
>
> Jameson
>
> 2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>
> You wrote:
>
> You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been
> just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as
> unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been
> wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the
> two groups as a whole
>
> [endquote]
>
> Ok, sure. You may have wronged them collectively, by electing  
> someone over whom
> no one in either group prefers anyone other than their favorite.
>
> The question is, how badly does that wrong them?
>
> Badly enough to give up FBC, SFC, LNHa, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump?
>
> The ABE problem might be a peculiarly American problem. I don't  
> expect others
> to recognize it as a problem. We have the Republocrats, and,  
> additionally, lots of
> small factions who are terribly mutually antagonistic, jealous, and  
> rivalry-inclined; but
> which, together, might add up to a majority.
>
> When the method in use meets LNHa and CD, you can middle-rate lesser- 
> evils if you want to, instead of
> not rating them. You can do that completely freely, with no  
> strategic hesitation. That
> would make all the difference in the U.S.
>
> > You wrote:
> >
> >> Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.
> >
> > [endquote]
> >
> > I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that
> > it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC
> > or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.
> >
> > And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of
> > someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their
> > favorite?
>
> You replied:
>
> So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of  
> the
> 9999 others so that you can pass the criteria above.
>
> ]endquote]
>
> I explicitly said that it isn't for those two voters. But yes, it's  
> in order to gain
> those criterion-compliances. Whether electing C, over whom no one  
> prefers anyone other
> than their favorite, wrongs someone too badly, is a matter for  
> individual judgment,
> a judgement that depends on whether, in your country, FBC, LNHa and  
> CD are necessary.
>
> FBC is absolutely necessary here. LNHa and CD are very desirable,  
> for the reason stated above.
>
> You wrote:
>
> If you highly value
> the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre  
> result.
> In my particular case, I don't consider FBC very important.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Of course you don't. You aren't in the U.S., England or Australia,  
> where FBC is necessary
> to avoid large-scale favorite-burial.
>
> Anyway, the electoral systems of most European countries are  
> probably fine as-is.
>
> You continued:
>
> But even if you like the FBC, couldn't you use one of the other  
> methods
> that pass FBC? I don't think any of these have such serious  
> instances of
> getting it wrong as Kevin's example shows MMPO does.
>
> (Though if you consider it important that a method should pass all the
> criteria above, and do so more than you think MMPO gets it wrong in
> Kevin's scenario, then sure.)
>
> [endquote]
>
> Quite so. That's why I consider MTA a good proposal, maybe the best.  
> Of the methods I've
> described to people new to voting systems, MTA is by far the most  
> popular. It's simple,
> obvious and natural. It meets FBC, 1CM, 3P, and avoids the possible  
> public-relations problems of failing
> Mono-Add-Plump or Kevin's MMPO bad-example.
>
> If there is one method I'd propose, it's MTA. But, when there's  
> opportunity for discussion, to find out
> if something better still is ask-able, I'd advocate such methods as  
> MMPO, MDDTR, and RCW (if I find that people don't
> consider RCW too complicated).   ..because, for the reasons that  
> I've told elsewhere, I consider the ABE to be
> a serious problem in this country.
>
> ABE failure can be dealt with, as I mentioned before. The A voters  
> can say:
>
> "If we were all co-operative and amicable, we could all vote for all  
> of our candidates. We all know
> that isn't so. Our faction is the largest non-C candidate, and the  
> one who will have the most top
> ratings (or votes in Approval). Therefore, we're going to vote only  
> for A. At such time as the B faction
> is larger than ours, then we will vote for B, just as we're now  
> asking you to vote for A."
>
> I'd be glad just to get the criterion compliances of MTA or even  
> Approval.
>
> Let me get specific about the lesser-evils problem:
>
> Here, we have two Greens parties: The original Greens, and the  
> larger newer Greens intended to
> replace them. In MTA I'd top rate the original Greens. I'd vote for  
> them in Approval.
>
> In MTA, I wouldn't middle-rate the newer replacment Greens. In  
> Approval, I wouldn't vote
> for them. But, in MDDTR, MMPO or RCW, I'd middle rate the newer  
> replacement Greens, because there's absolutely no
> strategic reason not to.
>
> Not relevant to this subject, another principle that relates to  
> lesser-evils:
>
> If, by rejecting some lesser-evil, your faction isn't big enough to  
> thereby make them lose, then of
> course you've lost nothing, but you've made a point.
>
> If your faction is strong enouth to make them lose, then you've made  
> an even stronger point.
> You've said, "principled people won't support your compromise".
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> Sure, that might help them win, but not at the expense of anyone  
> better. ...only instead of the Republocrats.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20111120/63e847e5/attachment-0004.htm>