<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On Nov 19, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA">MTA</a>? <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/CD">CD</a>? <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM">1CM</a>?<div><br></div><div>Also, although I happen to understand them, <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC">FBC</a>, <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/LNHa">LNHa</a>, <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SFC">SFC</a>, <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3P">3P</a>, <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ABE">ABE</a>, and <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/RCW">RCW</a>. Cut-and-pastes from old email messages are fine. I've done 4 or 5 abbreviation pages , at least 2 of which I've never used myself, so I think it's fair to start asking the people who are relying on the abbreviations to do the work themselves.</div></blockquote><div><br></div>It would help if, when continuing a conversation, talkers would help readers connect the parts by the "subject" staying the same or, at least, having the previous subject referenced in the body.</div><div><br></div><div>Passing out abbreviation pages would help if their "subject" made them findable.</div><div><br></div><div>Note that one detail in this conversation is sorting out the meaning of the various identifiers such as ABE.</div><div><br></div><div>Dave Ketchum<br><blockquote type="cite"> <div><br></div><div>Jameson<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"> <br> You wrote:<br> <br> You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been<br> just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as<br> unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been<br> wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the<br> two groups as a whole<br> <br> [endquote]<br> <br> Ok, sure. You may have wronged them collectively, by electing someone over whom<br> no one in either group prefers anyone other than their favorite.<br> <br> The question is, how badly does that wrong them?<br> <br> Badly enough to give up FBC, SFC, LNHa, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump?<br> <br> The ABE problem might be a peculiarly American problem. I don't expect others<br> to recognize it as a problem. We have the Republocrats, and, additionally, lots of<br> small factions who are terribly mutually antagonistic, jealous, and rivalry-inclined; but<br> which, together, might add up to a majority.<br> <br> When the method in use meets LNHa and CD, you can middle-rate lesser-evils if you want to, instead of<br> not rating them. You can do that completely freely, with no strategic hesitation. That<br> would make all the difference in the U.S.<br> <br> > You wrote:<br> ><br> >> Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.<br> ><br> > [endquote]<br> ><br> > I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that<br> > it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC<br> > or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.<br> ><br> > And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of<br> > someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their<br> > favorite?<br> <br> You replied:<br> <br> So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of the<br> 9999 others so that you can pass the criteria above.<br> <br> ]endquote]<br> <br> I explicitly said that it isn't for those two voters. But yes, it's in order to gain<br> those criterion-compliances. Whether electing C, over whom no one prefers anyone other<br> than their favorite, wrongs someone too badly, is a matter for individual judgment,<br> a judgement that depends on whether, in your country, FBC, LNHa and CD are necessary.<br> <br> FBC is absolutely necessary here. LNHa and CD are very desirable, for the reason stated above.<br> <br> You wrote:<br> <br> If you highly value<br> the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre result.<br> In my particular case, I don't consider FBC very important.<br> <br> [endquote]<br> <br> Of course you don't. You aren't in the U.S., England or Australia, where FBC is necessary<br> to avoid large-scale favorite-burial.<br> <br> Anyway, the electoral systems of most European countries are probably fine as-is.<br> <br> You continued:<br> <br> But even if you like the FBC, couldn't you use one of the other methods<br> that pass FBC? I don't think any of these have such serious instances of<br> getting it wrong as Kevin's example shows MMPO does.<br> <br> (Though if you consider it important that a method should pass all the<br> criteria above, and do so more than you think MMPO gets it wrong in<br> Kevin's scenario, then sure.)<br> <br> [endquote]<br> <br> Quite so. That's why I consider MTA a good proposal, maybe the best. Of the methods I've<br> described to people new to voting systems, MTA is by far the most popular. It's simple,<br> obvious and natural. It meets FBC, 1CM, 3P, and avoids the possible public-relations problems of failing<br> Mono-Add-Plump or Kevin's MMPO bad-example.<br> <br> If there is one method I'd propose, it's MTA. But, when there's opportunity for discussion, to find out<br> if something better still is ask-able, I'd advocate such methods as MMPO, MDDTR, and RCW (if I find that people don't<br> consider RCW too complicated). ..because, for the reasons that I've told elsewhere, I consider the ABE to be<br> a serious problem in this country.<br> <br> ABE failure can be dealt with, as I mentioned before. The A voters can say:<br> <br> "If we were all co-operative and amicable, we could all vote for all of our candidates. We all know<br> that isn't so. Our faction is the largest non-C candidate, and the one who will have the most top<br> ratings (or votes in Approval). Therefore, we're going to vote only for A. At such time as the B faction<br> is larger than ours, then we will vote for B, just as we're now asking you to vote for A."<br> <br> I'd be glad just to get the criterion compliances of MTA or even Approval.<br> <br> Let me get specific about the lesser-evils problem:<br> <br> Here, we have two Greens parties: The original Greens, and the larger newer Greens intended to<br> replace them. In MTA I'd top rate the original Greens. I'd vote for them in Approval.<br> <br> In MTA, I wouldn't middle-rate the newer replacment Greens. In Approval, I wouldn't vote<br> for them. But, in MDDTR, MMPO or RCW, I'd middle rate the newer replacement Greens, because there's absolutely no<br> strategic reason not to.<br> <br> Not relevant to this subject, another principle that relates to lesser-evils:<br> <br> If, by rejecting some lesser-evil, your faction isn't big enough to thereby make them lose, then of<br> course you've lost nothing, but you've made a point.<br> <br> If your faction is strong enouth to make them lose, then you've made an even stronger point.<br> You've said, "principled people won't support your compromise".<br> <br> Mike Ossipoff<br> <br> <br> <br> <br> Sure, that might help them win, but not at the expense of anyone better. ...only instead of the Republocrats.</blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div></body></html>