[EM] Kristofer: MMPO bad-example

[Jameson Quinn]

MTA <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA>?
CD<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/CD>?
1CM <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM>?

Also, although I happen to understand them,
FBC<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC>,
LNHa <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/LNHa>,
SFC<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SFC>
, 3P <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/3P>,
ABE<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/ABE>,
and RCW <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/RCW>. Cut-and-pastes from old
email messages are fine. I've done 4 or 5 abbreviation pages , at least 2
of which I've never used myself, so I think it's fair to start asking the
people who are relying on the abbreviations to do the work themselves.

Jameson

2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
> You wrote:
>
> You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been
> just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as
> unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been
> wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the
> two groups as a whole
>
> [endquote]
>
> Ok, sure. You may have wronged them collectively, by electing someone over
> whom
> no one in either group prefers anyone other than their favorite.
>
> The question is, how badly does that wrong them?
>
> Badly enough to give up FBC, SFC, LNHa, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump?
>
> The ABE problem might be a peculiarly American problem. I don't expect
> others
> to recognize it as a problem. We have the Republocrats, and, additionally,
> lots of
> small factions who are terribly mutually antagonistic, jealous, and
> rivalry-inclined; but
> which, together, might add up to a majority.
>
> When the method in use meets LNHa and CD, you can middle-rate lesser-evils
> if you want to, instead of
> not rating them. You can do that completely freely, with no strategic
> hesitation. That
> would make all the difference in the U.S.
>
> > You wrote:
> >
> >> Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.
> >
> > [endquote]
> >
> > I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that
> > it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC
> > or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.
> >
> > And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of
> > someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their
> > favorite?
>
> You replied:
>
> So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of the
> 9999 others so that you can pass the criteria above.
>
> ]endquote]
>
> I explicitly said that it isn't for those two voters. But yes, it's in
> order to gain
> those criterion-compliances. Whether electing C, over whom no one prefers
> anyone other
> than their favorite, wrongs someone too badly, is a matter for individual
> judgment,
> a judgement that depends on whether, in your country, FBC, LNHa and CD are
> necessary.
>
> FBC is absolutely necessary here. LNHa and CD are very desirable, for the
> reason stated above.
>
> You wrote:
>
> If you highly value
> the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre result.
> In my particular case, I don't consider FBC very important.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Of course you don't. You aren't in the U.S., England or Australia, where
> FBC is necessary
> to avoid large-scale favorite-burial.
>
> Anyway, the electoral systems of most European countries are probably fine
> as-is.
>
> You continued:
>
> But even if you like the FBC, couldn't you use one of the other methods
> that pass FBC? I don't think any of these have such serious instances of
> getting it wrong as Kevin's example shows MMPO does.
>
> (Though if you consider it important that a method should pass all the
> criteria above, and do so more than you think MMPO gets it wrong in
> Kevin's scenario, then sure.)
>
> [endquote]
>
> Quite so. That's why I consider MTA a good proposal, maybe the best. Of
> the methods I've
> described to people new to voting systems, MTA is by far the most popular.
> It's simple,
> obvious and natural. It meets FBC, 1CM, 3P, and avoids the possible
> public-relations problems of failing
> Mono-Add-Plump or Kevin's MMPO bad-example.
>
> If there is one method I'd propose, it's MTA. But, when there's
> opportunity for discussion, to find out
> if something better still is ask-able, I'd advocate such methods as MMPO,
> MDDTR, and RCW (if I find that people don't
> consider RCW too complicated).   ..because, for the reasons that I've told
> elsewhere, I consider the ABE to be
> a serious problem in this country.
>
> ABE failure can be dealt with, as I mentioned before. The A voters can say:
>
> "If we were all co-operative and amicable, we could all vote for all of
> our candidates. We all know
> that isn't so. Our faction is the largest non-C candidate, and the one who
> will have the most top
> ratings (or votes in Approval). Therefore, we're going to vote only for A.
> At such time as the B faction
> is larger than ours, then we will vote for B, just as we're now asking you
> to vote for A."
>
> I'd be glad just to get the criterion compliances of MTA or even Approval.
>
> Let me get specific about the lesser-evils problem:
>
> Here, we have two Greens parties: The original Greens, and the larger
> newer Greens intended to
> replace them. In MTA I'd top rate the original Greens. I'd vote for them
> in Approval.
>
> In MTA, I wouldn't middle-rate the newer replacment Greens. In Approval, I
> wouldn't vote
> for them. But, in MDDTR, MMPO or RCW, I'd middle rate the newer
> replacement Greens, because there's absolutely no
> strategic reason not to.
>
> Not relevant to this subject, another principle that relates to
> lesser-evils:
>
> If, by rejecting some lesser-evil, your faction isn't big enough to
> thereby make them lose, then of
> course you've lost nothing, but you've made a point.
>
> If your faction is strong enouth to make them lose, then you've made an
> even stronger point.
> You've said, "principled people won't support your compromise".
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
> Sure, that might help them win, but not at the expense of anyone better.
> ...only instead of the Republocrats.
>
>
>
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>
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