[EM] Kristofer: MMPO bad-example

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

You wrote:

You could of course argue that "if I gave it to B, A would have been 
just as unhappy, and if I gave it to A, B would have been just as 
unhappy, so I dare you to show me the particular group that has been 
wronged by this". I still think that you can say that you wronged the 
two groups as a whole

[endquote]

Ok, sure. You may have wronged them collectively, by electing someone over whom
no one in either group prefers anyone other than their favorite.

The question is, how badly does that wrong them?

Badly enough to give up FBC, SFC, LNHa, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump?

The ABE problem might be a peculiarly American problem. I don't expect others
to recognize it as a problem. We have the Republocrats, and, additionally, lots of
small factions who are terribly mutually antagonistic, jealous, and rivalry-inclined; but
which, together, might add up to a majority.

When the method in use meets LNHa and CD, you can middle-rate lesser-evils if you want to, instead of
not rating them. You can do that completely freely, with no strategic hesitation. That
would make all the difference in the U.S. 

> You wrote:
> 
>> Pleasing the two A=C and B=C voters is not worth 9999 votes.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> I've emphasized that I don't justify MMPO's result by saying that
> it's for those two voters. MMPO's rule's purpose is to meet FBC, SFC
> or SFC3, Later-No-Harm, CD, and Mono-Add-Plump.
> 
> And the cost of those big advantages is...what? The election of
> someone that over whom no one prefers anyone other than their
> favorite?

You replied:

So to be more precise, you're pleasing the two voters at the cost of the 
9999 others so that you can pass the criteria above. 

]endquote]

I explicitly said that it isn't for those two voters. But yes, it's in order to gain
those criterion-compliances. Whether electing C, over whom no one prefers anyone other
than their favorite, wrongs someone too badly, is a matter for individual judgment, 
a judgement that depends on whether, in your country, FBC, LNHa and CD are necessary.

FBC is absolutely necessary here. LNHa and CD are very desirable, for the reason stated above.

You wrote:

If you highly value 
the FBC, I can see that the criteria could outweigh the bizarre result. 
In my particular case, I don't consider FBC very important. 

[endquote]

Of course you don't. You aren't in the U.S., England or Australia, where FBC is necessary 
to avoid large-scale favorite-burial. 

Anyway, the electoral systems of most European countries are probably fine as-is. 

You continued:

But even if you like the FBC, couldn't you use one of the other methods 
that pass FBC? I don't think any of these have such serious instances of 
getting it wrong as Kevin's example shows MMPO does.

(Though if you consider it important that a method should pass all the 
criteria above, and do so more than you think MMPO gets it wrong in 
Kevin's scenario, then sure.)

[endquote]

Quite so. That's why I consider MTA a good proposal, maybe the best. Of the methods I've 
described to people new to voting systems, MTA is by far the most popular. It's simple, 
obvious and natural. It meets FBC, 1CM, 3P, and avoids the possible public-relations problems of failing 
Mono-Add-Plump or Kevin's MMPO bad-example.

If there is one method I'd propose, it's MTA. But, when there's opportunity for discussion, to find out
if something better still is ask-able, I'd advocate such methods as MMPO, MDDTR, and RCW (if I find that people don't 
consider RCW too complicated).   ..because, for the reasons that I've told elsewhere, I consider the ABE to be
a serious problem in this country.

ABE failure can be dealt with, as I mentioned before. The A voters can say:

"If we were all co-operative and amicable, we could all vote for all of our candidates. We all know
that isn't so. Our faction is the largest non-C candidate, and the one who will have the most top 
ratings (or votes in Approval). Therefore, we're going to vote only for A. At such time as the B faction
is larger than ours, then we will vote for B, just as we're now asking you to vote for A."

I'd be glad just to get the criterion compliances of MTA or even Approval.

Let me get specific about the lesser-evils problem:

Here, we have two Greens parties: The original Greens, and the larger newer Greens intended to
replace them. In MTA I'd top rate the original Greens. I'd vote for them in Approval. 

In MTA, I wouldn't middle-rate the newer replacment Greens. In Approval, I wouldn't vote
for them. But, in MDDTR, MMPO or RCW, I'd middle rate the newer replacement Greens, because there's absolutely no 
strategic reason not to.

Not relevant to this subject, another principle that relates to lesser-evils:

If, by rejecting some lesser-evil, your faction isn't big enough to thereby make them lose, then of
course you've lost nothing, but you've made a point.

If your faction is strong enouth to make them lose, then you've made an even stronger point. 
You've said, "principled people won't support your compromise". 

Mike Ossipoff




Sure, that might help them win, but not at the expense of anyone better. ...only instead of the Republocrats.