[EM] Approval Bad Example

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/9 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval
> order in the scenario
>
> 49 C
> 27 A>B
> 24 B
>
> It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, (2)
> discourage "chicken"  strategy,
> (3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,
>  then our method must allow
> equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is
> advanced to top equal with A in
> the middle faction:
>
> 49 C
> 27 A=B
> 24 B
>
> Then if sincere preferences are
>
> 49 C
> 27 A>B
> 24 B>A,
>
> the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B
> supporters are sincerely indifferent
> between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B
> elected.
>
> Do we agree on this?
>

I do, at least. I disagree with any criteria that say that A must win in
the top example; that only encourages A voters to dishonestly add B even if
they don't prefer her.


>
> Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... is
> there a method that satisfies
> this which also satisfies the FBC?
>

Yes. 321 voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/321_voting>.


>
> Forest
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