[EM] Approval Bad Example

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/9 Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>

> 2011/11/9 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>
>> I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval
>> order in the scenario
>>
>> 49 C
>> 27 A>B
>> 24 B
>>
>> It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion,
>> (2) discourage "chicken"  strategy,
>> (3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,
>>  then our method must allow
>> equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is
>> advanced to top equal with A in
>> the middle faction:
>>
>> 49 C
>> 27 A=B
>> 24 B
>>
>> Then if sincere preferences are
>>
>> 49 C
>> 27 A>B
>> 24 B>A,
>>
>> the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B
>> supporters are sincerely indifferent
>> between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B
>> elected.
>>
>> Do we agree on this?
>>
>
> I do, at least. I disagree with any criteria that say that A must win in
> the top example; that only encourages A voters to dishonestly add B even if
> they don't prefer her.
>
>
>>
>> Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ...
>> is there a method that satisfies
>> this which also satisfies the FBC?
>>
>
> Yes. 321 voting <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/321_voting>.
>

Note that 321 voting can fail the chicken dilemma/ABE if there are clones
of candidate C. However, it would take some fine vote management to ensure
that the clones worked but didn't win. Personally, I believe that a party
cloning strategy would be very hard in practice.

Jameson



>
>>
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