[EM] Approval Bad Example

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval order in the scenario

49 C
27 A>B
24 B

It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, (2) discourage "chicken"  strategy, 
(3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,  then our method must allow 
equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is advanced to top equal with A in 
the middle faction:

49 C
27 A=B
24 B

Then if sincere preferences are

49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A,

the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B supporters are sincerely indifferent 
between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B elected.

Do we agree on this?

Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... is there a method that satisfies 
this which also satisfies the FBC?

Forest