[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

[Terry Bouricius]

Dave,

I think you make a common semantic manipulation about the nature of a 
Condorcet winner (particularly in a "weak" CW example) by using the term 
"wins by a majority." In fact, each of the separate and distinct pairwise 
"majorities" may consist largely of different voters, rather than any 
solid majority. This is why I think the Mutual-Majority Criterion is a 
more useful criterion. In a crowded field, a weak CW may be a 
little-considered candidate that every voter ranks next to last.  The 
phrase "wins by a majority" creates the image in the reader's mind of a 
happy satisfied group of voters (that is more than half of the electors), 
who would feel gratified by this election outcome. In fact, in a weak CW 
situation, every single voter could feel the outcome was horrible if the 
CW is declared elected. Using a phrase like "wins by a majority" creates 
the false impression that a majority of voters favor this candidate OVER 
THE FIELD of other candidates AS A WHOLE, whereas NO SUCH MAJORITY 
necessarily exist for there to be a Condorcet winner. The concept of 
Condorcet constructs many distinct majorities, who may be at odds, and 
none of which actually need to like this Condorcet winner. I am not 
arguing that the concept of "Condorcet winner" is not a legitimate 
criterion, just that its normative value is artificially heightened by 
saying the candidate "wins by a majority" when no such actual solid 
majority needs to exist.

Terry Bouricius

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Dave Ketchum" <davek at clarityconnect.com>
To: <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>
Cc: <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 7:23 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2


Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.

In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M.  Who has any business 
objecting?
      52 of 100 prefer M over D
      53 of 100 prefer M over R
      Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes.

As to my  "no first preferences" example, surest way to cause such is to 
be
unable to respond to them.

DWK

On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
>>>James Gilmour had written:
>>>It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected
>>>by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33%
>>>for the other two candidates.  But I find it completely unimaginable,
>>>ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be
>>>elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two
>>>candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences.
>>>Condorcet winner  - no doubt.  But effective President  -  never!
>>
>
> Dave Ketchum  > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM
>
>>Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely.
>>
>>Second preferences?
>>      That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates.
>>      The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for 
>> they
>>are likely enemies of each other.
>>      The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5%
>>makes this seem possible.
>>      Could elect a candidate who got no first preference
>>votes?  Seems unlikely.
>>
>>I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and
>>acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate.
>>
>>Any other unlikely to be a winner.
>>
>>What were you thinking of as weak winner?
>
>
> I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all.  The "no first 
> preferences" example is so extreme I would not consider it
> realistic.  But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first 
> preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
> would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be 
> disastrous.
>
> The two situations I had in mind were:
> Democrat candidate D;  Republican candidate R;  "centrist" candidate M
>
> Election 1
> 35% D>M;  33% R>M;  32% M
>
> Election 2
> 48% D>M;  47% R>M;  5% M
>
> M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political 
> consequences of the two results would be very different.  My own view
> is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the 
> result of the second election would be unacceptable to the
> electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored 
> completely!).  If such an outcome is possible with a
> particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system 
> will not be adopted for public elections.
>
> James
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.



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