[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

[Dave Ketchum]

Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be 
objectionable.

In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M.  Who has any business objecting?
      52 of 100 prefer M over D
      53 of 100 prefer M over R
      Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes.

As to my  "no first preferences" example, surest way to cause such is to be 
unable to respond to them.

DWK

On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
>>>James Gilmour had written:
>>>It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected 
>>>by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33% 
>>>for the other two candidates.  But I find it completely unimaginable, 
>>>ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be 
>>>elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two 
>>>candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences.
>>>Condorcet winner  - no doubt.  But effective President  -  never!
>>
> 
> Dave Ketchum  > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM 
> 
>>Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely.
>>
>>Second preferences?
>>      That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates.
>>      The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for they 
>>are likely enemies of each other.
>>      The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5% 
>>makes this seem possible.
>>      Could elect a candidate who got no first preference 
>>votes?  Seems unlikely.
>>
>>I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and 
>>acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate.
>>
>>Any other unlikely to be a winner.
>>
>>What were you thinking of as weak winner?
> 
> 
> I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all.  The "no first preferences" example is so extreme I would not consider it
> realistic.  But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
> would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be disastrous.
> 
> The two situations I had in mind were:
> Democrat candidate D;  Republican candidate R;  "centrist" candidate M
> 
> Election 1
> 35% D>M;  33% R>M;  32% M
> 
> Election 2
> 48% D>M;  47% R>M;  5% M
> 
> M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of the two results would be very different.  My own view
> is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of the second election would be unacceptable to the
> electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored completely!).  If such an outcome is possible with a
> particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not be adopted for public elections.
> 
> James
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  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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