[EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2

Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Mon Dec 22 16:23:27 PST 2008

Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be 

In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M.  Who has any business objecting?
      52 of 100 prefer M over D
      53 of 100 prefer M over R
      Neither R nor D got a majority of the votes.

As to my  "no first preferences" example, surest way to cause such is to be 
unable to respond to them.


On Mon, 22 Dec 2008 10:18:34 -0000 James Gilmour wrote:
>>>James Gilmour had written:
>>>It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA elected 
>>>by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35% and 33% 
>>>for the other two candidates.  But I find it completely unimaginable, 
>>>ever, that a candidate with 5% of the first preferences could be 
>>>elected to that office as the Condorcet winner when the other two 
>>>candidates had 48% and 47% of the first preferences.
>>>Condorcet winner  - no doubt.  But effective President  -  never!
> Dave Ketchum  > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2008 4:24 AM 
>>Such a weak Condorcet winner would also be unlikely.
>>Second preferences?
>>      That 5% would have to avoid the two strong candidates.
>>      The other two have to avoid voting for each other - likely, for they 
>>are likely enemies of each other.
>>      The other two could elect the 5%er - getting the 5% 
>>makes this seem possible.
>>      Could elect a candidate who got no first preference 
>>votes?  Seems unlikely.
>>I see the three each as possibles via first and second preferences - and 
>>acceptable even with only 5% first - likely a compromise candidate.
>>Any other unlikely to be a winner.
>>What were you thinking of as weak winner?
> I'm afraid I don't understand your examples at all.  The "no first preferences" example is so extreme I would not consider it
> realistic.  But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
> would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would be disastrous.
> The two situations I had in mind were:
> Democrat candidate D;  Republican candidate R;  "centrist" candidate M
> Election 1
> 35% D>M;  33% R>M;  32% M
> Election 2
> 48% D>M;  47% R>M;  5% M
> M is the Condorcet winner in both elections, but the political consequences of the two results would be very different.  My own view
> is that the result of the first election would be acceptable, but the result of the second election would be unacceptable to the
> electorate as well as to the partisan politicians (who cannot be ignored completely!).  If such an outcome is possible with a
> particular voting system (as it is with Condorcet), that voting system will not be adopted for public elections.
> James
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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