[EM] RE : Re: Clone proofing Copeland

Chris Benham chrisjbenham at optusnet.com.au
Wed Jan 3 07:33:04 PST 2007

Kevin Venzke wrote:

>--- Brian Olson <bql at bolson.org> a écrit :
>>If I understand this, it's a Condorcet cycle resolution system based  
>>purely on who was 1st pick on each ballot. So, count up the virtual  
>>round robin matrix, and count 1st place votes separately for later if  
>>It's incomplete. A Condorcet method can elect someone no one put in  
>>for first place. It can even have a cycle of people no one voted for  
>>first place.
>It counts first preferences of candidates defeating the potential
>winner pairwise. A CW will always have a score of zero under this
>However, you are right about there being a little cause for concern:
>34 A>E>F
>33 B>E>F
>33 C>E>F
>I believe this is an E-F tie. E's win over F is worthless due to E's
>lack of first preferences.
>Kevin Venzke
On  the pure method Forest suggested,  I make this an A-E-F tie (all 
with a score of zero).

But what is wrong with my suggestion of first dropping from the ballots 
the non-members of  the
Schwartz set?

Chris Benham

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