[EM] POLL: Ballots and results

[Michael Ossipoff]

> I can live with Tideman Ranked Pairs.
>
> Now lets craft some credible legislative language for it.
>
>
Brief introductory definition:

Elect the candidate who isn’t beaten among all the strongest defeats that
don’t contradict (form any cycle(s) with) eachother.

A possible longer legislation wording:

List the pairwise-defeats one at a time, strongest ones first.

But if the next strongest one cycles with any listed defeats, then skip
that one.

When all defeats have been listed or skipped, elect the candidate not
beaten by any listed defeat.

Of course either would have to be preceded by the same preliminary
definitions as any pairwise-count method.

The short definition is probably unambiguous enough for a legislative
definition, but the longer one might be preferred.

Tideman RP?  It’s long been accepted that wv is better than margins, due to
Minimal-Defense compliance.  ..& the resulting reduction of strategy-need

In fact, it has been pointed-out here that the autodeterence of the wv.
Condorcet methods brings complete freedom from any defensive strategy at
all.

One could still use the defensive-truncation afforded by Minimal-Defense,
but that would be optional, for if one wants to further enhance deterrence
by adding that of Minimal-Defense’s defensive truncation.

The autodeterence is strong. But defensive-truncation provides certain,
inevitable penalty, in addition to the (strong) probabilistic autodeterence.

RP(margins), if that’s what Tideman RP implies, is a very different method
from RP(wv).

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