[EM] POLL: Ballots and results
Toby Pereira
tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk
Sat May 18 12:20:46 PDT 2024
Thanks for doing this Kristofer. If I counted correctly Ranked Pairs beat Benham 5-4 with two ties, so not a particularly significant result in that respect. But it must have had at least two more approvals given that Minmax is between them. Perhaps it would have been interesting to have the margins version on the ballot to see how it compared. I think people likely just saw Ranked Pairs on the ballot and left it at that. I'm not sure exactly what the difference between them would be in practice. I think it's been said that winning votes protects against burial better, but if it does that by punishing burial by causing a worse result for everyone, it's not necessarily a good thing. People won't necessarily know the optimum strategy when using a voting system. Ranked ballots all look the same after all.
Toby
On Saturday 18 May 2024 at 00:36:32 BST, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
Here are the ballots in EM format:
1: Approval > STAR > ApprovalRunoff > Benham = SchwartzWoodall = Woodall
> RankedPairs > Minmax > SmithApprovalImplicit > Schulze > Baldwin =
CondorcetBorda = CopelandBorda = DoubleDefeatHare = MSA = MSMLV = MSTB =
Raynaud = RCIPE = SmithApprovalExplicit = SmithDAC = SmithScore > MJ >
IRV > Plurality
1: IRV > STAR > ApprovalRunoff > Approval > Baldwin = Benham =
CondorcetBorda = CopelandBorda = DoubleDefeatHare = Minmax = MJ = MSA =
MSMLV = MSTB = RankedPairs = Raynaud = RCIPE = Schulze = SchwartzWoodall
= SmithApprovalExplicit = SmithApprovalImplicit = SmithDAC = SmithScore
= Woodall > Plurality
1: MSA > SmithApprovalExplicit = SmithApprovalImplicit = IRV = Benham =
DoubleDefeatHare > RankedPairs = Schulze > Approval > Minmax > Baldwin =
CondorcetBorda = CopelandBorda = MSMLV = MSTB = Raynaud = RCIPE =
SchwartzWoodall = SmithDAC = SmithScore = Woodall > MJ > STAR =
ApprovalRunoff = Plurality
1: Approval > RankedPairs > STAR > Woodall > SmithDAC > Minmax > RCIPE >
Benham > MSA > SmithApprovalExplicit > ApprovalRunoff > MSMLV >
SmithApprovalImplicit > DoubleDefeatHare > Raynaud > Schulze >
SchwartzWoodall > SmithScore > MJ > Plurality > IRV > CondorcetBorda >
Baldwin > CopelandBorda
1: STAR > SmithScore > Baldwin = Benham = CondorcetBorda = CopelandBorda
= Raynaud = Minmax = RankedPairs = Schulze = SchwartzWoodall =
SmithApprovalExplicit = SmithApprovalImplicit = SmithDAC = Woodall = MSA
= MSMLV = MSTB > ApprovalRunoff > Approval > RCIPE > DoubleDefeatHare >
MJ > IRV > Plurality
1: RankedPairs > Schulze = Benham > Woodall > Minmax > SchwartzWoodall >
SmithApprovalImplicit = SmithApprovalExplicit > SmithScore > Raynaud >
Baldwin > MJ > DoubleDefeatHare = MSTB = MSMLV = MSA > CopelandBorda >
SmithDAC > ApprovalRunoff > STAR > RCIPE > CondorcetBorda > Approval >
IRV > Plurality
1: CondorcetPlur > Minmax > RankedPairs > Schulze > BTRIRV > Baldwin =
Benham = CondorcetBorda = CopelandBorda = MSA = MSMLV = MSTB = Raynaud =
SchwartzWoodall = SmithApprovalExplicit = SmithApprovalImplicit =
SmithDAC = SmithScore = Woodall > IRV > Approval > STAR > Plurality > Score
1: RCIPE > Benham > Minmax > RankedPairs > Woodall > SchwartzWoodall >
Baldwin > CopelandBorda > CondorcetBorda > Schulze > SmithScore >
Raynaud > MSTB > MSMLV > SmithDAC > DoubleDefeatHare > IRV > MJ > STAR >
Approval > MSA > SmithApprovalExplicit > SmithApprovalImplicit >
Plurality > ApprovalRunoff
1: Approval > SmithScore > MSA > SmithApprovalExplicit > RankedPairs >
Benham > Minmax > STAR > ApprovalRunoff = Baldwin = CondorcetBorda =
CopelandBorda = DoubleDefeatHare = IRV = MJ = MSMLV = MSTB = Raynaud =
RCIPE = Schulze = SchwartzWoodall = SmithApprovalImplicit = SmithDAC =
Woodall > Plurality
1: STAR > SmithScore > Score > MJ > Approval = SmithApprovalExplicit =
SmithApprovalImplicit = MSA > ApprovalRunoff = RankedPairs = Schulze >
Baldwin = Benham = CopelandBorda = MSMLV = MSTB = Raynaud =
SchwartzWoodall = SmithDAC = Woodall > CondorcetBorda = Minmax > RCIPE >
IRV > Plurality
1: Benham > SchwartzWoodall > Woodall > RankedPairs > Schulze > MSTB >
Minmax > BTRIRV > Raynaud > Baldwin > RCIPE > IRV > SmithDAC > MSMLV >
MSA > SmithApprovalExplicit > SmithApprovalImplicit > SmithScore >
DoubleDefeatHare > CopelandBorda > CondorcetBorda > Approval > MJ >
Score > ApprovalRunoff > STAR > Plurality > Borda
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Ranked Pairs is the CW -- and Benham beats everybody but Ranked Pairs
pairwise. This can be verified by going to Rob LeGrand's calculator
(http://www.cs.angelo.edu/~rlegrand/rbvote/calc.html with mirror
https://munsterhjelm.no/km/rbvote/calc.html for people outside the US)
and selecting "calculate all winners".
Here are the Schulze results:
1 Ranked Pairs (wv)
2 Benham
3 Approval
Minmax (wv)
Schulze
STAR
7 Smith//Score
8 Margins-Sorted Approval
Schwartz Woodall
Smith//Approval (implicit)
Woodall
12 Smith//Approval (explicit)
13 Raynaud
14 Baldwin
15 Max Strength Transitive Beatpath
16 Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes
Smith//DAC
18 Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)
19 Condorcet//Borda (Black)
20 Approval with manual runoff
Double Defeat, Hare
RCIPE
23 Majority Judgement
24 IRV
25 Plurality
26 BTR-IRV (write-in)
27 Score (write-in)
28 Borda (write-in)
Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)
The Approval voting results:
1 Ranked Pairs (wv)
2 Minmax (wv)
3 Benham
STAR
Woodall
6 Approval
7 Approval with manual runoff
Margins-Sorted Approval
Schulze
10 Schwartz Woodall
Smith//Approval (explicit)
Smith//Approval (implicit)
Smith//Score
14 Baldwin
BTR-IRV (write-in)
Condorcet//Borda (Black)
Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)
Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)
Double Defeat, Hare
IRV
Majority Judgement
Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes
Max Strength Transitive Beatpath
Raynaud
RCIPE
Score (write-in)
Smith//DAC
28 Borda (write-in)
Plurality
and for fun, Schulze with ties broken by Approval:
1 Ranked Pairs (wv)
2 Benham
3 Minmax (wv)
4 STAR
5 Approval
6 Schulze
7 Smith//Score
8 Woodall
9 Margins-Sorted Approval
10 Schwartz Woodall
Smith//Approval (implicit)
12 Smith//Approval (explicit)
13 Raynaud
14 Baldwin
15 Max Strength Transitive Beatpath
16 Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes
Smith//DAC
18 Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)
19 Condorcet//Borda (Black)
20 Approval with manual runoff
21 Double Defeat, Hare
RCIPE
23 Majority Judgement
24 IRV
25 Plurality
26 BTR-IRV (write-in)
27 Score (write-in)
28 Condorcet//Plurality (write-in)
29 Borda (write-in)
This should be accurate, but if you spot a typo or other mistake
somewhere, let me know.
-km
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