[EM] Request for help: List of Pathological Elections

Closed Limelike Curves closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com
Tue May 7 20:53:41 PDT 2024


Omegatron, Michael:

I understand the importance of consensus and neutral point-of-view, and
I'll do my best to keep those in mind.

That said, some Wikipedia articles *need* to be rewritten almost from
scratch. I recommend taking a quick look at the Instant-Runoff Voting
Wikipedia page, which includes substantial edits from a certain unknown
anonymous user by the name of [[User:RRichie]]. 🤔 As well as a very
interesting banner near the top.

Notable contributions include:

> Proponents of IRV claim that IRV eliminates the spoiler effect,[1][2][3]
> [4] since IRV makes it safe to vote honestly for marginal parties: Under
> a plurality method, voters who sympathize most strongly with a marginal
> candidate are strongly encouraged to instead vote for a more popular
> candidate who shares some of the same principles, since that candidate has
> a much greater chance of being elected and a vote for the marginal
> candidate will not result in the marginal candidate's election. An IRV
> method reduces this problem, since the voter can rank the marginal
> candidate first and the mainstream candidate second; in the likely event
> that the fringe candidate is eliminated, the vote is not wasted but is
> transferred to the second preference.
>

 The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem demonstrates that no (deterministic,
> non-dictatorial) voting method using only the preference rankings of the
> voters can be entirely immune from tactical voting. This implies that IRV
> is susceptible to tactical voting in some circumstances.



> Research concludes that IRV is one of the voting methods least vulnerable
> to tactical voting, with theorist Nicolaus Tideman noting that,
> "alternative voting is quite resistant to strategy",[citation needed] and
> Australian political analyst Antony Green dismissing suggestions of
> tactical voting.



> The 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont, provides an example in
> which strategy theoretically could have worked but would have been unlikely
> in practice. In that election, most supporters of the candidate who lost in
> the final round (a Republican who led in first choices) preferred the
> Condorcet winner, a Democrat, to the IRV winner, the Progressive Party
> nominee. If 371 (24.7%) out of the 1,510 backers of the Republican
> candidate (who also preferred the Democrat over the Progressive candidate
> for mayor) had insincerely raised the Democrat from their second choice to
> their first (not changing their rankings relative to their least favorite
> candidate, the Progressive), the Democrat would then have advanced to the
> final round (instead of their favorite), defeated any opponent, and
> proceeded to win the IRV election.[citation needed] This is an example of
> potential voter regret in that these voters who sincerely ranked their
> favorite candidate as first, find out after the fact that they caused the
> election of their least favorite candidate, which can lead to the voting
> tactic of compromising.



On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 6:58 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> Omegatron, Michael:
>
> I understand the importance of consensus and neutral point-of-view, and
> I'll do my best to keep those in mind.
>
> That said, some Wikipedia articles deserve to be rewritten from scratch. I
> recommend taking a quick look at the Instant-Runoff Voting Wikipedia page,
> which includes substantial edits from a certain unknown anonymous user by
> the name of [[User:RRichie]]. 🤔
> [image: image.png]
> [image: image.png]
> [image: image.png]
>
>
> On Tue, May 7, 2024 at 9:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-05-06 21:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> > It is my opinion that "Plurality" and "First-Past-The-Post" are
>> synonymous.
>> >
>> > But looking at your Wiki page, I am concerned in how you would ever
>> > know for certain an election is spoiled with FPTP.  I mean, like Florida
>> > 2000, perhaps the Ralph Nader voters would have split even up between
>> > George W Bush and Al Gore.  Not likely, but we don't know without the
>> > ranked ballot.
>>
>> I suppose we could use polls to argue that the possibility exists, if
>> those polls ask for pairwise or ranked/rated preference information. It
>> would depend on the accuracy of the poll, e.g. if it asks both "Who
>> would you vote for in the election" and "out of X and Y, who would you
>> rather see win", and the former matches the actual outcome, then that
>> would suggest the latter is accurate too.
>>
>> It won't be ironclad, of course. But without the ballots, nothing is :-)
>>
>> -km
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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