[EM] Part 2, Approval vs Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 09:53 Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> Arguably one problem with approval voting is that people might refuse to
> approve the "lesser evil" of the two main candidates because they see it as
> a vote for and an endorsement of them.
>

Good.

…&, if they do approve evil, they don’t like him, & so they also approve
the better candidate, whom they like better.

[…]

[quote]
 Under FPTP, people will often say they could not vote for x, even if it's
between x and y, and they prefer x to y. This is likely to carry over into
approval voting.
[/quote]

You better believe it.

[quote]
Obviously under approval voting, the hope is that higher quality candidates
will be in the running (as has been argued for Stein in this case), but
this is not guaranteed to always happen.
[\quote]

Usually there are Progressives.



> Toby
>
> On Friday, 22 March 2024 at 06:43:17 GMT, Michael Ossipoff <
> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Some pragmatics:
>
> What would happen this November if we were using Approval?
>
> There are lesser-evil hold-your-nose voters who are going to vote for
> Biden though they don’t like him, because they think they have to accept
> lesser-evil because (I guess?) they’ve been told that everyone else wants
> evil
> :-)
>
> Those people would probably approve Biden, whether they really approve of
> him or not.
>
> But they’d also approve Jill Stein, because they prefer her (though they
> now, with Plurality, mistakenly believe it unrealistic to vote for her).
>
> Polls show something like 70% of Americans don’t want the Democrats or
> Republicans, & want different parties.
>
> Polls show that the same % want a lot of policies that are the opposite of
> what the Republocratic party are imposing on them.
>
> The policies that they say they want are the ones that the Greens offer.
> No I’m not electioneering. It isn’t possible to discuss voting without
> sometimes saying something like that. It’s necessary to speak of
> pragmatics, & that requires specifics.
>
> My reason for saying that is to support my claim that those people who now
> are going to vote for Biden as lesser-evil, would, in Approval, also
> approve Jill Stein.
>
> Just about everyone who approves Joe would approve Jill.
>
> But many (including me) who approve Jill would never consider approving
> Joe !!!
>
> Therefore Jill would beat Joe & Donald.
> ——-
> Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the voter-median. …& so
> Approval quickly homes in on the CW.
>
> A Myerson-Weber equilibrium is an outcome that is consistent with, &
> therefore appears to confirm, the assumptions that led to that outcome.
>
> ——-
>
> Advantages of Approval over ranks-methods:
>
> Approval is the absolutely minimal voting-system that allows & counts free
> expression of acceptance or merit, & comparisons of it, among several or
> many candidates in a multicandidate election.
>
> …& is therefore the unique completely unarbitrary method.
>
> With any other method, people will ask, “But why *this* method among all
> the many others?”
>
> Approval isn’t subject to that question, because there’s only one
> absolutely minimal method.
>
> Approval is uniquely easy to define, explain, propose, enact, administer,
> & security-audit against count-fraud.
>
> Those are a lot of big, & absolutely-necessary, advantages.
>
> Let’s start with count-fraud:
>
> If there are 20 candidates, Approval has 20 vote-totals to sum, keep track
> of, audit & send to Central-Count
>
> Condorcet has 380 pairwise votes to calculate, sum, keep track of, audit &
> send to Central-Count.
>
> About 20 times more vote-totals.
>
> Additionally, in Approval, it’s only necessary to increment a number when
> encountering a vote.
>
> …while, in Condorcet, each pairwise vote must first be found by running a
> subroutine on a ranking.
>
> So, overall, how many times more computation does Condorcet need?
>
> A hundred times more? Several hundred times more?
>
> How about a handcount audit?
>
> For Condorcet ?  :-D
>
> Now chance.
>
> A spot-check?
>
> It would have to be a much tinier spot, sample.
>
> Did you know that, after both of Dubya’s elections, Harper’s Magazine
> reported mountains of evidence for big count-fraud?
>
> Don’t ignore or discount count-fraud. Minimizing the chance of successful
> count-fraud is absolutely-essential.
>
> This concludes p
> Part 2.
>
> Part 3 (of 3) will be along next.
>
> ----
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>
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