[EM] Part 3 of Approval vs Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

Part 3:

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Part 2 didn’t send. I wrote it on my phone, & it failed to send. Hopefully
a copy will be returned to me, so that I can try again to send it. But I’m
writing this Part 3 on the desk-computer, so that I can save it in Word, so
that, whatever happens with unsuccessful sending, I’ll have it to resend.

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Approval-Advantages continued:

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Let’s talk about enactment:

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The incomparably easier implementation makes Approval much more enactable.
Let me say more about easy implantation: Approval can be implemented with
no new balloting-equipment, & also without even any software-modifications.
Here’s a way:

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The existing Plurality-count software is designed for collecting  a single
vote in a race. So tell the count-program that there are many 2-way races
(one for each candidate). The ballot has a line for each candidate’s name &
voting-bubble. But, alternating with those lines, are blank lines, where
the count-program expects votes for the nonexistent other candidate in the
fictitious 2-way race.

…

So, when the counting is done, the count-program will report the results
for all those fictitious 2-way races, including 0 for each of the
vote-totals for the nonexistent opponents, & also the vote-totals for each
actual candidate.

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In that way, the existing Plurality count-software will give the totals for
each actual candidate, summed over all the ballots.

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So that’s why I said that Approval can be implemented at zero cost. No
software modification needed.

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Now, what does FairVote (under various names) have to show for its 35 years
of expensively promoting IRV (under various names)?  Two states & some
cities.

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Two states.

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Sorry, but I don’t call that success. Sure, if the people of Oregon &
Nevada have been well-enough deceived, there could be two more states this
year. But 4 out of 50 sounds more like failure for a 35-year effort.

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If Approval had been the proposal over that period, it would be in use in
all 50 states by now.

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Critreria:

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Just as an added bonus:

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Approval passes several criteria that Condorcet fails:

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Participation, Consistency, & IIAC (all without loss of Pareto).

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I don’t include FBC, because Condorcet’s FBC-failure that we discussed at
EM a long time ago is so rare as to be strategically-irrelevant.

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If burial is a problem, then FBC-failure comes back when we need
favorite-burying drastic defenses to try to protect CW from burial. But the
wv Condorcet-versions are so burial-deterrent, in 2 separate ways
(Minimal-Defense & autodeterrence*), that burial can be ignored when voting.

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*Even without any defensive-truncation, burial’s backfire is 10 times more
likely than its success.

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[Conclusion of this short Part 3]

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If Part 2 hasn’t been sent yet, & doesn’t automatically get sent, hopefully
a copy will be returned to me, & I’ll then send it along.

…

I have to say that, from now on, anything long will be written in word on
the desktop computer instead of on the phone, for safekeeping of long
messages in case they fail to send & are lost.
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