[EM] Open letter to STAR voting promoters

[Michael Ossipoff]

wv Condorcet isn’t a method. It’s a class of Condorcet methods that resolve
circular-ties based on pairwise-defeat strengths, where the strength of a
pairwise defeat is measured by the number of people ranking the defeater
over the defeated.

It isn’t a general definition of a class that specifies requirements for
defining as-yet unspecified new members. Instead it’s a collective name for
*a few particular*methods that measure defeat-strength in that manner.

In fact, by “wv Condorcet”, I mean either RP(wv), Schulze, SSD, MinMax(wv),
& Smith//MinMax.

(…all of which have been amply defined here.)

If someone wanted a broader definition, that could be:

 A method that uses defeat-strengths, which are defined  as I described, &
has the defensive-strategy properties that I’ve specified for the
above-listed methods.

But the previous definition, as one of a certain few particular methods, is
what I mean by the term.

Yes, I blocked you, & you remain blocked.

But I’ve now blocked the most frequent posters (who never seem to stop
posting daily or nearly daily).  … & nearly all of those who post
frequently by any standard.

Sometimes there’s a topic that I want to comment on, &, when I check for
them, some blocked sender has said something that I might not have already
answered enough times yet.

:-)


Sometimes I’m too lazy, or it’s too late in the day, to do something
worthwhile, like sending a proposal or trying to organize an
initiative-committee, & so, with so little EM mail now, due to
garbage-filtering, I might check to find out if any garbage-spewers have
said something that I’ve only answered 99 times.

It’s easy enough if I’m checking for their posts in a current topic.  But
any less recent posts will be interspersed among thousands of unwanted
advertisements. …& they’re automatically deleted after a month anyway.

So it’s mostly recent garbage-posts that I ever take the time to check for.

But the important thing about this is that I’m not willing to have the
garbage-spewers’ **** dumped on my screen every day. So the blocking is
definitely serving it’s purpose.








On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 13:41 robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On 06/05/2024 8:55 AM EDT Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
> >
> > What do you think of  Adam Tarr's old idea of using  A-B-C--D-E-F
> > "grading" ballots with the idea of using them to infer ranking to elect
> > a Condorcet winner and if there isn't one then interpreting the A-B-C
> > grades as Approval?
>
> Why not just A-B as Approval?  Or why not A-B-C-D as Approval?  Or why not
> just A as Approval (I know that would result in Condorcet-Plurality).  What
> rhyme or reason is used to determine where the Approval cutoff is?
>
> > He liked Condorcet//Approval but also possible with these ballots is
> > Smith//Approval and  Margins-Sorted Approval and a few others.
> >
> > I don't see such a big problem with high-resolution score ballots as
> > long as it is made clear to the voters (and is true) that their
> > approximate ratings of the candidates will work just as well for them as
> > their exact ones.
>
> Please take a look at these templates for RCV legislation:
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DGvs2F_YoKcbl2SXzCcfm3nEMkO0zCbR/view .
>
> Even though the actual legislation is not verbatim with these templates,
> the IRV template (first one) has actually been used for the content of the
> ballot question for an initiative for IRV.  The second template has BTR-IRV.
>
> Now consider the last three templates ("Straight-ahead Condorcet").  So
> this is specifically about what to put in subdivision (4) to replace:
>
> "(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the candidate
> having the plurality of first preferences is elected."
>
> What exactly will the language be to replace that line of code?
>
> "(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then ..." what?
>
> Perhaps,
>
> "(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the candidate
> receiving the most first and second preferences is elected."
>
> I might call that Condorcet-Bucklin.  Bucklin and Approval have something
> in common and that common property is that it's "counting marks" and not
> counting people.  This may be perceived by some legal analysts as violating
> One-person-one-vote, I dunno.
>
> Would that be a little more resistant to the burying strategy than
> Condorcet-Plurality?  How about comparing it to Condorcet-TTR, which is
> nearly Condorcet-IRV?
>
> "(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the two
> candidates receiving the most first preferences shall runoff against each
> other and the candidate in that pair that is preferred over the other by
> the greater number of voters shall be elected."
>
> How would MO's "wv-Condorcet" be worded? (Since he is apparently not
> plonking me as was threatened.)
>
> It needs to be short and sweet.  ("Sweet" means that it ostensibly elects
> the candidate with the "greatest" voter support, however that voter support
> is defined.  But the definition of that "greatest" voter support needs to
> be simple and understandable and make sense to pedestrians.)
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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