[EM] Open letter to STAR voting promoters

[Closed Limelike Curves]

ICA and ICT seem like they could be fine, but I'm slightly hesitant because
they violate later-no-help; that means you should expect turkey-raising. I
mentioned earlier that, ideally I'd want later-no-help and FBC, but what I
really want is to be sure the optimal strategy is sincere and elects the
Condorcet winner.

On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 5:56 AM Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:

> Robert,
>
> What do you think of  Adam Tarr's old idea of using  A-B-C--D-E-F
> "grading" ballots with the idea of using them to infer ranking to elect
> a Condorcet winner and if there isn't one then interpreting the A-B-C
> grades as Approval?
>
> He liked Condorcet//Approval but also possible with these ballots is
> Smith//Approval and  Margins-Sorted Approval and a few others.
>
> I don't see such a big problem with high-resolution score ballots as
> long as it is made clear to the voters (and is true) that their
> approximate ratings of the candidates will work just as well for them as
> their exact ones.
>
> Chris B.
>
>
> On 5/06/2024 2:33 am, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> >
> >> On 06/04/2024 12:22 PM EDT fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> On Mon, Jun 3, 2024 at 8:41 PM Richard, the VoteFair guy wrote:
> >>> they are basically just supplying money to the huge(!)
> >>>   number of Oregon voters who understand that ranked choice ballots are
> >>>   much better than STAR ballots.
> >> Score ballots are superior to ranked ballots.
> > Not for governmental elections.  Elections are not about utility.  Not
> utilitarian.  We are partisans that vote by secret ballot and not judges
> for the Figure Skating event at the Olympics.  When we vote, we don't have
> to be "fair to the other side".
> >
> > We vote to best serve our own political interests.  It's a battle of
> sorts.  They call them "campaigns".
> >
> >> They are easier to fill out.
> > That's horseshit.  Requires voters to not only say who they prefer over
> the others, but then they have to figure out *how* *much* they prefer that
> candidate over the others and then they have to figure out whether or not
> they're shooting themselves in the foot by ranking some second-choice (or
> lesser evil) higher or lower.  In any Cardinal system and whenever there
> are 3 or more candidates (especially if they are non-trivial candidates),
> the voter is faced with the decision of how much to score (or whether to
> approve) their second-choice (or lesser evil) candidate.  Score them too
> high and you hurt your favorite.  Score too low and you help your greater
> evil.
> >
> > You CES guys keep repeating this falsehood with ***zero*** evidence.
> And it doesn't even make common sense.
> >
> >>   They allow expression of strength of preference and indifference.
> > Yes.  And that expression will be exaggerated by partisans.  And the
> timid that worry about the greater evil might be pressured to reduce that
> expression.
> >
> > And Approval ballots are Score ballots, with two levels of scoring.  How
> much expression is there?  The amount of expressivity of Score ballots is
> related to how many levels of scoring is there.  More levels, more
> expressivity.  Why not have 100 levels?  My vote for Candidate Whoever is
> the sqrt(3).  Can we get fractional-resolution in expressivity?
> >
> > There is the Paradox of Choice problem.  At some point, more degree of
> choice makes it **harder** to choose.
> >
> >> They stay the same from one election to the next, regardless of the
> number of candidates. They don't require limiting your rankings to top 5
> for space in an election with 20 candidates, etc. etc.
> > Ordinal ballots stay the same, too.
> >
> > This whole thing is just baloney:  Claim followed by claim followed by
> claim.  Nothing really backing it up.
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
> >
> > "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> >
> > .
> > .
> > .
> > ----
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> info
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