[EM] November election with Approval & Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

So, in a public political election among the 7 candidates that I named, my
ballot would be:

Approval:

Cornell West
Jill Stein
Marianne Williamson

wv Condorcet:

1. Cornell West
2. Jill Stein
3. Marianne Williamson
———-
wv Condorcet, as I mean it, would be:

RP(wv) or MinMax(wv).

Preferably RP(wv).
————
The choice between West & Stein is difficult. Especially in Plurality.

I like West’s more extreme progressivism.

But Jill (or the Green Party) is the one who’s winning ballot-access all
around the country, & has the most name-recognition…& she is fully
progressive enough.

But, in some polls, West is beating Stein.

…probably because many of her preferrers are already giving it all away to
Joe.

…& more of West’s preferrers have no use for that giveaway.

So then, which is more winnable? Jill or Cornell?


On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 12:36 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Actual elections are the best demonstration & clarification for voting
> systems. That’s an important value of polls. How would you vote in November
> with Approval or Condorcet?
>
> (This post isn’t a poll-suggestion …at least not yet).
>
> So say it’s an assortment of progressives, & Republocrats, Libertarians &
> the like, but just a few of them:
>
> e.g. Cornell West, Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson, JFK Jr, the
> Libertarian, Joe Biden & Donald Trump.   …7 candidates.
>
> With Approval:
>
> Of course it’s well-known that most people, at least 2/3,  want a whole
> list of things that the two right-wings of the Republocratic Party will
> never allow.
>
> That’s why there’s the Green Party, among others, to offer those things.
>
> But it’s also well-known that most of those many people who want better
> than Republocratic are going to vote Republocratic…for Joe, because they
> want to support some pretty horrific & despicable war-crimes that are about
> to result in an arrest-warrant.
>
> Of course those who are going to insincerely vote for Joe in Plurality
> will surely approve him in Approval.
>
> But the big advantage with Approval is that those voters, even if they
> feel a need to fully vote for Joe over Donald, can also support the
> candidates who offer what they actually really want.
>
> For one thing, in that way those voters aren’t really doing any
> harm—They’re just canceling themselves out. That might not sound like much,
> but it’s better than now with Plurality, which forces people (in their
> mistaken perception) to vote worse over better.
>
> If the number of honest, non-giveaway, progressives is greater than the
> genuine Republocratic-prreferrers, then a genuinely preferred candidate
> will actually win, for a change. Don’t say that can’t happen.  Polls say at
> least 2/3 want many changes that no Republocrat would allow.
>
> But,aside from that, the Approval count result will show the full genuine
> support for the genuinely-preferred candidates.
>
> That will show the giveaway voters that they needn’t do so. Approval’s
> Meyerson-Weber equibrium is at the voter-median.
>
> Sincere CWs will start winning.
>
> Actually, in polls, I haven’t heard of one in which Approval didn’t choose
> the voted CW.
>
> Sure, it’s been said that it would be better for a sincere CW to
> immediately win, rather than wait for Approval to reach its voter-median
> equilibrium.
>
> wv Condorcet is better for the lesser-evil giveaway voter who believes
> that an evil is acceptable, because it allows hir to freely vote favorite
> over compromise.
>
> Yes, but, for one thing, if it takes a lot longer to enact Condorcet,
> might not Approval reach its median equilibrium before Condorcet even gets
> enacted?
>
> Additionally, what good will Condorcet’s ideal result do, when the winner
> is instead chosen by count-fraud…which the rank-methods greatly facilitate
> by their computation-intensive count?
>
> I claim that there are unacceptable candidates. Then Approval is the
> perfect strategy-free method: Simple approve (only) all of the Acceptables.
>
> Suppose you agree that Republicrats are unacceptable. So just approved the
> candidates better than them.  …the ones who offer what we actually want.
>
> I’d approve (only) all of the Progressives.
>
> It has been lamented that someone doesn’t know whether to approve his 2nd
> choice.
>
> Well, if there are unacceptable candidates, is your 2nd choice acceptable?
> If yes, than approve hir. If no, then don’t approve hir. How hard is that?
>
> The other ways I’ve described for choosing whom to approve are for when
> they’re all acceptable to you. They aren’t difficult either. No need to
> repeat them here.
>
> With wv Condorcet:
>
> I’d rank sincerely.
>
> If it’s only a poll, I’d rank everyone, which is safe due to probabilistic-
> autodeterence.
>
> If it’s an actual public political election, I’d only rank the
> Acceptables, to get the *additional* inevitable penalization of burial that
> happens if others likewise do that defensive-truncation.
>
> …just an added precaution.
>
> Ideally, with unacceptable candidates in a public political  election, one
> would do the drastic defensive-strategy of IRV, with *any* rank-method,
> even the best.
>
> In practice that’s, for all practical purposes, unnecessary with wv
> Condorcet, & wouldn’t be a good idea, because the lesser-evil
> giveaway-voters might notice you doing that, & then do the same to protect
> their Democrat…which would defeat the whole purpose of good Condorcet
> methods.
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